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Risk aversion, the value of information and traﬃc equilibrium∗
André de Palma† Robin Lindsey‡ Nathalie Picard§
December 13, 2008
Abstract
Information about traﬃc conditions has traditionally been conveyed to drivers by radio and variable message
signs, and more recently via the Internet and Advanced Traveler Information Systems. This has spurred research
on how travelers respond to information, how much they are willing to pay for it and how much they are likely
to benefit from it collectively. In this paper we analyze the decisions of drivers whether to acquire information
and which route to take on a simple congested road network. Drivers vary in their degree of risk aversion with
respect to travel time. Four information regimes are considered: No information, Free information which is
publicly available at no cost, Costly information which is publicly available for a fee, and Private information
which is available free to a single individual. Private information is shown to be individually more valuable
than either Free or Costly information, while the benefits from Free and Costly information cannot be ranked
in general. Free or Costly information can decrease the expected utility of drivers who are very risk-averse,
and with suﬃcient risk aversion in the population the aggregate compensating variation for information can be
negative.
Introduction
For decades information about driving conditions and traﬃc delays has been provided to drivers by radio, TV
and variable message signs. It has also long been recognized that the relation between individual and aggregate
drivers’ behaviour depends on the specification of information availability (see the seminal paper of Mahmassani et
al., 1986). More recently, information has become available via telephone information systems, Advanced Traveler
Information Systems (ATIS) and the Internet. The advent of modern communications technology has spurred
research on how travelers respond to information, how much they are willing to pay for it and how much they
are likely to benefit from it individually and collectively. Because information aﬀects individual travel decisions,
individual travel decisions collectively aﬀect travel conditions, and travel conditions determine what information
should be conveyed, a complex and recursive set of interdependencies exists.
Due to these complexities much of the research on ATIS has considered simple road networks and focused on
just one or two dimensions of travel behaviour. Furthermore, it is usually assumed that travelers seek to minimize
their expected travel costs. In a context where route choice is a decision variable this implies that travelers choose
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a route with the lowest expected travel time. But it is unrealistic to assume that expected travel time is the only
criterion for route choice (Jackson and Jucker, 1981; Abdel-Aty et al., 1997), and a number of recent studies (e.g.,
Bates et al, 2001; Lam and Small, 2001; Brownstone and Small, 2005; Small et al., 2005; de Palma and Picard, 2005)
provide convincing empirical evidence that travelers dislike not only travel time but also uncertainty about travel
time. de Palma and Picard (2006) incorporate travel time uncertainty into the analysis of information systems
with endogenous route choice by assuming that travelers are risk averse and seek to maximize their expected utility
where utility is a decreasing and concave function of travel time. However, these authors do not analyze the
decisions of drivers whether to acquire information or the welfare impacts of information as a function of its cost.
This paper builds on de Palma and Picard (2006) by assuming that information is costly and considering the
decisions of drivers whether to purchase it. The paper therefore spans the literature on demand for information
with endogenous route choice with risk-neutral drivers (e.g., Yang, 1998; Lo et al., 1999; Lo and Szeto, 2002) and
the literature that adopts a utility-theoretic approach with risk-averse drivers but does not analyze demand for
information (e.g., Mirchandani and Soroush, 1987; Kobayashi, 1994; Tatineni et al., 1997; Yin and Ieda, 2001a,b;
Chen et al., 2002; Yin et al., 2004). In our model, individuals have a choice between a “safe” route, and a “risky”
route with a travel time that fluctuates from day to day according to a known probability and according to known
road performance functions. Individuals are risk averse and weigh average travel time and variability of travel time
when choosing a route. Individuals diﬀer in their degrees of risk aversion so that they trade oﬀ expected travel
time and variability of travel time at diﬀerent rates. By combining costly information and risk aversion, the paper
takes an important step towards a realistic analysis of the developing market for driver information systems that
may ultimately provide significant benefits to drivers in terms of quicker and more predictable trips. Heterogeneity
in risk aversion eﬀectively plays an analogous role to heterogeneity in value of travel time which is an important
determinant of travel decisions such as mode choice and whether to use toll lanes. In the model, risk aversion
governs whether individuals prefer the “safe” route or the “risky” route in the absence of information, and how
much they are willing to pay for information about conditions on the “risky” route. By modeling risk aversion the
paper accounts not only for the benefits from ATIS in reducing average travel times but also the benefits (or costs)
to drivers from changes in the variability in travel times.
Four information regimes are considered. In the No information regime drivers do not have day-specific in-
formation and base their route-choice decisions on the unconditional probability distribution of states which they
are assumed to know. The second regime is one of Free information in which all drivers receive free and accurate
information about travel conditions each day. In the third regime of Costly information drivers can purchase the
information. The analysis focuses on how the purchase decision depends on the fee and the individual degree of
risk aversion, as well as on how the route-choice decisions of informed drivers aﬀect the expected utilities of drivers
who do not purchase information. The final information regime is one of Private information in which information
is available free to a single individual.
Three results stand out. One is that an individual driver always benefits more from Private information
than from Free information or Costly information. The second – and less obvious – finding is that both Free
information and Costly information leave suﬃciently risk-averse drivers worse oﬀ even though individually they
may be willing to pay for the information. Third, if there are enough highly risk-averse drivers in the population
the aggregate compensating variation for information may be negative. All three results derive from the fact that,
while information helps drivers to make better decisions individually (and never worse decisions), their collective
response to information can exacerbate the distribution and variability of congestion delay on the network, and
may even leave drivers collectively worse oﬀ.
In summary the analysis is based on a stochastic network deterministic user equilibrium (SN-DUE) model in
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which road network capacity is stochastic and users do not have idiosyncratic perception errors. Route-choice
behaviour is based on expected utility theory. The model is static in the sense that users know the probability
distribution of states conditional on the information regime so that learning does not take place. Finally, the ATIS
provides perfect rather than imperfect information. Although this framework is restrictive it permits the derivation
of analytical results that have an intuitive appeal and should help to promote understanding of more complicated
simulation, experimental and empirical studies of ATIS.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and explains the measurement of welfare
change using compensating variation. As a benchmark, Section 3 analyzes the equilibria and welfare properties
of the information regimes when drivers are risk-neutral. Section 4 derives equilibria for the No information
and Free information regimes when drivers are risk averse, and analyzes the positive and normative impacts of
Free information. Section 5 – which constitutes the heart of the paper – conducts a parallel analysis for Costly
information. Section 6 considers Private information and compares its benefits with the benefits of Free information
and Costly information. Section 7 presents a numerical example that illustrates the theoretical results and conveys
a sense of the magnitude of the welfare impacts. Section 8 concludes.
1 The model
This section presents the model which is based on de Palma and Picard (2006). It defines the information regimes
and explains the measurement of welfare change. Notation is modified and simplified where feasible to streamline
extensions in later sections.
1.1 Assumptions
A continuum of drivers with mass N travels from a common origin to a common destination. N is fixed and
exogenous. Each driver has to choose between a safe route, S, with a deterministic and known travel time, tS , and
a risky route, R, with a stochastic travel time, TR, which depends on the state. There are two states: a good state
denoted “−” with a travel time t−R, and a bad state denoted “+” with a larger travel time t
+
R > t
−
R. For brevity
the two states will hereafter be called Good days and Bad days. The probability of a Bad day is p ∈ (0,1) which
is assumed fixed and exogenous. Thus:
P
¡
TR = t+R
¢
= p, and P
¡
TR = t−R
¢
= 1− p.
There is congestion on route S, as well as on route R on Bad days, in the sense that travel time on route j increases
with the number, Nj , of users who choose route j, j = R,S. However, there is no congestion on route R on Good
days: t−R is constant. To formalize:
Assumption 1 Travel time tS(NS) is continuous and strictly increasing in NS. On Good days travel time on
route R is a constant t−R. On Bad days, travel time on route R is a continuous and strictly increasing function
t+R(NR) of NR.
Therefore, t+R(0) represents free-flow travel time on route R on bad days. Three further assumptions are made
about travel times. First, on Good days route R is faster than S even with NS = 0. Second, on Bad days travel
time on R is always longer than on Good days even with NR = 0. Finally, if all drivers choose one route on a Bad
day then it is slower than the other (unused) route. Therefore:
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Assumption 2 t−R < tS(0) < t
+
R(N) and t
−
R < t
+
R(0) < tS(N).
No assumption is made about the relative magnitudes of tS(0) and t+R(0) or t
+
R(N) and tS(N).
Assumptions 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1. The number of drivers taking route R, NR, is measured in
the usual way to the right from the left-hand vertical axis, while the number taking route S, NS , is measured to
the left from the right-hand axis. Travel times are measured on the vertical axes. Functions t+R(NR) and tS(NS)
intersect where NR > 0 and NS > 0, and lie wholly above the horizontal line at t−R.
Figure 1 about here
Drivers’ preferences are specified in:
Assumption 3 Drivers’ preferences are represented by a diﬀerentiable utility function U (t; θ) where θ ≥ 0 is the
risk aversion parameter. For θ = 0, U (t; 0) = − (a+ t), where a ≥ 0. For θ > 0 and t > 0, U (t; θ) is strictly
decreasing and strictly concave in t. Writing U (t; θ) as U (u; θ) where u = U (t; θ), for θ > 0: (a) ∂U (t; θ) /∂θ is
a strictly concave function of u and (b) Lim
θ→∞
U (t2; θ) /U (t1; θ) =∞, for t2 > t1 > 0.
Property (a) in the last sentence of Assumption 3 is used to prove Lemma 1 below. Property (b) is a technical
condition. It formalizes the idea that additional travel time is disproportionately costly for an “infinitely” risk-
averse individual. It is straightforward to check (see Appendix 1) that Assumption 3 is satisfied for Hyperbolic
Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) preferences which include Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences
and Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) preferences as special cases. For HARA the utility function is
U (t; θ) = − (a+t)
1+θ
1+θ , a ≥ 0, for CRRA it is U (t; θ) = −
t1+θ
1+θ , and for CARA it is U (t; θ) =
1−exp(tθ)
θ . CARA
preferences will be adopted in the numerical example of Section 6.
Expected utility on a route is EU (T ; θ) = pU (T+; θ) + (1− p)U (T−; θ), where T+ denotes travel time on the
route on Bad days, and T− denotes travel time on Good days. The distribution of θ in the population is described
in:
Assumption 4 The risk aversion parameter θ has a continuous distribution over an interval I, with either I =
R+ or I =
h
0; θM
i
⊂ R+ for θM ∈ [0,∞). The distribution is characterized by the strictly increasing CDF
F (θ) ∈ [0; 1] , ∀ θ ∈ I, and by the density f (θ) > 0, ∀ θ in the interior of I. If the distribution is bounded then
EU
³
TR (N) ; θM
´
< U
³
tS (0) ; θM
´
.
The last sentence of Assumption 4 implies that either expected travel time is larger on R when all drivers select
R, or θM is suﬃciently large. This assumption is necessary for an interior equilibrium to exist. Otherwise, all the
users would select R when the state is unknown. No similar assumption is necessary when θ is distributed over R+
since the assumption t+R(N) > tS(0) guarantees that a suﬃciently risk-averse driver prefers route S to route R.
Before turning to the information regimes some justification for the assumptions is in order. As noted in the
introduction, restrictive assumptions are required for the model to be analytically tractable and the assumptions
chosen allow us to concentrate on the eﬀects of drivers’ aversion to travel time variability. The assumption that
the number of users, N, is fixed means that travel demand is deterministic and price inelastic. This is a common
assumption in the literature on ATIS and it is reasonable in settings where travelers have few alternatives to
driving. Some other studies (e.g., Emmerink et al., 1996; Zhang and Verhoef, 2006) adopt models with elastic
travel demand while treating route and other choices as fixed.
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Stochasticity is manifest in the model only on route R. On Good days travel time on route R is constant, and
on Bad days there is congestion and travel time is higher. Route R can be thought of as a multilane freeway that,
under ideal conditions (Good days), has adequate capacity to handle all traﬃc (N users) at free-flow speeds. But
when conditions are impaired (Bad days), capacity is reduced and congestion develops. (According to Assumption
2, free-flow travel time is also higher than on Good days.) Non-ideal conditions can arise for various reasons:
bad weather that makes the surface slippery, reduces visibility or requires snow plowing; natural disasters such
as rock slides; accidents or disabled vehicles that block one or more lanes; unscheduled road maintenance and so
on. The probability of Bad days is treated as exogenous. This is reasonable for acts of nature, but problematic
for accidents and other anthropogenic causes. Nevertheless, most existing ATIS studies treat state probabilities as
exogenous. Moreover, empirical studies of the relationship between the frequency of accidents and traﬃc volumes
have produced mixed results. The additional assumption that drivers know the probabilities allows us to focus on
risk rather than uncertainty. If the probabilities were unknown, learning would take place, and this would make
the problem far more complex (see Chancelier et al., 2007).
The assumption that travel time on route S is deterministic also deserves comment. One possibility is that route
S is equipped with emergency or breakdown lanes that can accommodate disabled vehicles and vehicles involved in
accidents without reducing throughput. The assumption may also be reasonable if route S is located in a corridor
that is not susceptible to landslides, fog and other forces that cause Bad days on route R.
Assumption 3 stipulates that drivers’ preferences are defined in terms of utilities rather than costs and that
drivers choose the route with the higher expected utility. Although expected utility theory is now being challenged
in the field of transportation (e.g. Avineri and Prashker, 2004, 2005; see also de Palma et al., 2008), it is still
the most common paradigm. Note, however, that the model developed here (based on a binary distribution of
travel time) trivially extends to the most common deviations to expected utility: probability weighting, prospect
theory and cumulative prospect theory. Introducing expected and non expected utility in Random Utility Models
and other Discrete Choice Models remains an open and challenging topic (see de Palma et al., 2008). Note that
expected utility maximization includes expected travel cost minimization as a special case that is analyzed as a
benchmark in Section 3.
1.2 Information regimes
Four information regimes will be considered that diﬀer according to drivers’ knowledge of the state when they
choose a route:
No information (Z ): drivers know the probability p, but not the actual state.
Free information (F ): all drivers are informed about the state at no cost.
Costly information (C ): any driver can learn the state at a cost π.
Private information (I ): a single driver learns the state at no cost.
It is assumed that for each information regime, all drivers know the probability distribution of travel times
on the two routes conditional on the information regime and whether they are personally informed. (It is not
necessary for drivers to know the distribution of risk attitudes in the population or for them to predict what route
each individual driver will choose. All they need to know is aggregate usage on each route in each state.) With
Private information the equilibrium is the same as with No information since, with a continuum of drivers, the
route choice of one driver does not aﬀect traﬃc conditions.
In the case of Costly information it is assumed that the price of information is equivalent to an increase in
travel time, with the value of time (VOT) normalized to unity and hence independent of θ. Expected utility can
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then be written EU (T + π; θ). This specification incorporates two underlying assumptions. One is that VOT is
independent of the duration of a trip and the same for uncongested and congested travel time. The second is
that individuals have the same risk attitudes towards travel time and monetary cost. There is little empirical
evidence on which to judge the validity of this second assumption. Aversion to travel time uncertainty is now well
documented in the literature. In general people also dislike uncertainty about payment even when the amount
at stake is small. However, a majority of drivers are favorably disposed towards High Occupancy Toll (HOT)
lane facilities in the U.S. where tolls vary dynamically in near real-time to maintain free-flow conditions. Users of
the toll lanes therefore purchase a (nearly) risk-free travel time in exchange for an uncertain price. This type of
opportunity is not available on other tolled facilities or in the model used here, and driver attitudes may diﬀer.
Denote usage of the two routes on Good days by N−R and N
−
S , and on Bad days by N
+
R and N
+
S . For all regimes
except Free information the division of traﬃc between routes is characterized by:
Proposition 1 On Bad days, in the No information, Costly information and Private information regimes, traﬃc
N+R on R is such that t
+
R
¡
N+R
¢
> tS
¡
N+S
¢
.
Proof. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that route R is preferred by all users to route S on Good days even if everyone
takes R. If R were also preferred to S on Bad days, then R would be preferred to S whatever the state. But this
implies N+R = N and t
+
R (N) ≤ tS (0), which contradicts Assumption 2.
Depending on their preferences and on π, in the Costly information regime drivers choose between three
strategies:
• Strategy R (nR drivers): Do not pay for information and choose route R in both states.
• Strategy S (nS drivers): Do not pay for information and choose route S in both states.
• Strategy I (nI drivers): Pay for information. Given Assumption 2 and Proposition 1, the best choice when
informed is route R on Good days and route S on Bad days.
The following conservation laws apply: nR + nS + nI = N+R +N
+
S = N
−
R +N
−
S = N.
Traﬃc Nqj on route j when the state is q is therefore as given in Table 1:
Route j \ State q Bad days (q = “ + ”) Good days (q = “− ”)
j = R N+R = nR N
−
R = nR + nI = N − nS
j = S N+S = nS + nI = N − nR N
−
S = nS
Table 1: Route split in Costly information regime
The strategies, the numbers of drivers choosing each strategy, their route choices and expected utilities in the
four information regimes are summarized in Table 2. Note that Strategies R and S are equivalent to a route choice
in both states. With Strategy I, drivers select route R on Good days and route S on Bad days. (With Free
information all drivers are informed at no cost. Since, however, nF+R drivers take route R on Bad days they can
be thought of as choosing Strategy R and ignoring the state.)
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Strategy
Numbers
of drivers
Bad
days
Good
days
Expected utility
No information
R nZR R R pU
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
S nZS S S U
¡
tS
¡
nZS
¢
; θ
¢
Free information
R nF+R = N
+
R R R pU
¡
t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
I nF+I = N
+
S S R pU
¡
tS
¡
nF+I
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
Costly information
R nCR R R pU
¡
t+R
¡
nCR
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
S nCS S S pU
¡
tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
tS
¡
nCS
¢
; θ
¢
I nCI S R pU
¡
tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
+ π; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R + π; θ
¢
Private information
R nZR R R pU
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
S nZS S S U
¡
tS
¡
nZS
¢
; θ
¢
I Single driver S R pU
¡
tS
¡
nZS
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
Table 2: Strategies, numbers of drivers, route choices and expected utilities
1.3 Measuring welfare change
Willingness to pay is measured in economics using compensating variation and equivalent variation (see Varian
1992, Chapter 10). The compensating variation (CV) is defined to be the amount an individual is willing to pay
for a change to take place, whereas equivalent variation (EV) is defined to be the amount an individual requires in
order to be as well oﬀ as if a change takes place. Compensating variation will be adopted here since it is assumed
when assessing the Free, Costly and Private information regimes that information is actually provided so that
the change does take place. CV will be measured in time units in the same way that the cost of information is
measured; thus it corresponds to the additional certain travel time that a driver is willing to incur for information.
Since the value of time (VOT) is assumed to be constant, if desired CV can be translated into monetary units by
multiplying the CV by the VOT.
Definition 1 The individual compensating variation for information regime r, CV r (θ), r ∈ {F,C, I}, corresponds
to the additional time an individual with utility U (.; θ) is willing to incur for a shift to regime r from the No
information regime. CV r (θ) is defined implicitly by the condition EUr (T + CV r (θ) ; θ) = EUZ (T ; θ).
(Note that the corresponding definition for EV is EUr (T ; θ) = EUZ (T −EV r (θ) ; θ) which does not yield the
same value as CV unless U (.; θ) is linear; i.e. the individual is risk-neutral.) The CV for information depends, a
priori, on who receives it, and the CVs for Free, Costly and Private information all diﬀer in general. Naturally,
proprietary information is never unfavorable to an individual. But when other individuals also have access to
information, they may respond to it in ways that exacerbate the distribution of congestion on the network.
2 Risk-neutral drivers
To develop a preliminary understanding of the model, as well as to provide a benchmark against which to assess
the implications of risk aversion, it is instructive to identify and characterize equilibria for the four information
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regimes when drivers are risk neutral. (Risk neutrality is a limiting case of the model with a compact distribution
of risk aversion with parameter θM in Assumption 4 set to zero.)
2.1 Free information
In the Free information regime all drivers choose route R on Good days and incur a travel cost CF− = t−R.
The equilibrium corresponds to point F−R in Figure 2 with coordinates
¡
nR = N, t−R
¢
, where the subscript R on
F−R indicates that the outcome is realized on Route R. On Bad days, drivers divide themselves between routes
according to Wardrop’s principle so that travel costs are equalized: CF+ = t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
= tS
¡
nF+S
¢
= tS
¡
N − nF+R
¢
.
The corresponding point in Figure 2 is F+R,S where the subscript R,S indicates that the outcome is realized on
both routes. Expected travel costs are ECF = (1− p)CF− + pCF+ = (1− p) t−R + pt
+
R
¡
nF+R
¢
.
Figure 2 about here
2.2 No information and Private information
If drivers do not know the state then they do not know actual travel costs on each route. However, if drivers are risk
neutral, they are only concerned with expected travel cost, and they prefer the route with lower expected travel cost.
Following Emmerink (1998) it is assumed that Wardrop’s principle applies in terms of expected travel costs; thus,
drivers allocate themselves between routes so that expected travel costs are equal: ECZ = (1− p) t−R + pt
+
R
¡
nZR
¢
=
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
. (To obtain nZS = N − nZR > 0, the probability of Bad days must satisfy p >
tS(0)−t−R
t+R(N)−t
−
R
.) Point Z•S
identifies the equilibrium for users of Route S. This outcome is certain because travel costs are the same in both
states. Point Z−R identifies the outcome for users of Route R on Good days, and Z
+
R the outcome on Bad days.
The comparative statics properties of the equilibrium are derived in Appendix 2 and presented in Table 3.
p N
nR < 0 ∈ (0, 1)
nS > 0 ∈ (0, 1)
E ·CZ > 0 > 0
Table 3: Comparative statics properties of No information equilibrium with risk neutral drivers
As expected, an increase in the probability of Bad days reduces usage of route R, increases usage of route S, and
increases expected travel costs. If the number of drivers increases, usage of both routes increases as do expected
travel costs.
With risk-neutral drivers the CV for Free information is simply the diﬀerence in expected costs between the No
information and Free information regimes: CV F = ECZ − ECF = p
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
− t+R
¡
nF+R
¢¢
> 0. CV F is positive
because on Bad days fewer drivers take route R; i.e. nF+R < n
Z
R. The welfare gain can be decomposed into three
parts. First, on Good days information benefits drivers who would otherwise take route S. This benefit is identified
by the speckled area labeled B− in the lower right of Figure 2. Second, on Bad days information benefits drivers
who take route R as indicated by the speckled area B+ in the upper left. Finally, information imposes a loss on
drivers who take route S as shown by the shaded area L+ to the upper right. (Area B− corresponds to what
Zhang and Verhoef (2006) call decision-making benefits. Areas B+ and L+ correspond to what they call travel
cost benefits (or costs).) The loss L+ is outweighed by the benefits B− and B+. To see this geometrically note
that area B− (weighted by the probability of Good days) equals the area of the rectangle defined by points Z•S ,
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Z+R , t
Z+
R and t
Z
S (weighted by the probability of Bad days) which exceeds area L
+. Area B− thus outweighs area
L+, and area B+ adds to the net benefit.
Free information reduces expected travel time, as well as variability of travel time on route R. But it also
raises travel time on Bad days on route S (since tS
¡
nF+S
¢
> tS
¡
nZS
¢
) and results in travel time uncertainty for all
drivers. This uncertainty is of no consequence per se for risk-neutral drivers, but it does matter with risk-averse
drivers as will be shown in Section 4.
Before turning to Costly information consider the Private information regime. If a single driver is informed he
can take route R on Good days, and route S on Bad days. The CV for Private information is CV I = ECZ −ECI
= p
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
− tS
¡
nZS
¢¢
> 0. CV I exceeds the CV for Free information since tS
¡
nZS
¢
< t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
= tS
¡
nF+S
¢
.
Information is always valuable when it is private because the benefits of shifting to route S on Bad days are not
dissipated by similar adjustments of other drivers. As will be seen, the advantage of Private information over Free
information holds – and with greater force – when drivers are risk-averse.
2.3 Costly information
Equilibrium for the Costly information regime with risk-neutral drivers is derived in Appendix 2. In order for some
drivers to be willing to purchase information (Strategy I) the cost cannot be too high; otherwise the equilibrium is
the same as with No information. Regardless of the cost of information some drivers choose not to purchase it and
stick to route R (Strategy R). If the cost of information exceeds a lower bound then some drivers choose Strategy
S; otherwise all drivers adopt either Strategy R or Strategy I. The comparative statics properties of equilibrium
are presented in Table 4. Predictably, as the cost of information increases, nCI decreases and n
C
R and n
C
S increase.
As the probability of Bad days increases, nCS rises and n
C
R falls. As shown in Appendix 2, n
C
I increases if p is small,
and decreases if p is large. This is because travel time uncertainty is greatest for intermediate values of p. Perhaps
surprisingly, nS is independent of N . To see why, note that the choice between strategies I and S depends on the
cost of information relative to the travel time saved on Good days from taking route R. Since both the cost of
information and travel time on R on Good days are constants, travel time on route S must also be constant and
hence usage of S must be independent of N . This result does not obtain with risk-averse drivers as shown below.
π p N
nR > 0 < 0 ∈ (0, 1)
nS
> 0 if nS > 0
0 if nS = 0
> 0 if nS > 0
0 if nS = 0
0
nI < 0
> 0 if nS > 0 and p small
< 0 if nS > 0 and p large
> 0 if nS = 0
∈ (0, 1)
ECC > 0 > 0 > 0
Table 4: Comparative statics properties of Costly information equilibrium with risk-neutral drivers
Equilibrium with Costly information is depicted in Figure 3 for the case with nCS > 0. On Good days, Groups
R and I take Route R and realize an outcome at point C−R,I . Group S incurs a higher cost at point C
−
S . On Bad
days, Group R ends up at point C+R , while Groups S and I incur a lower cost at point C
+
S,I . Group I enjoys the
best of both worlds, but pays a fee π for the privilege.
Figure 3 about here
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Since expected travel costs are the same for all three groups, the CV for Costly information can be computed
for any one of them. For Group R, expected costs are ECCR = (1− p) t−R+pt
+
R
¡
nCR
¢
, and hence CV C = ECZ−ECCR
= p
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
− t+R
¡
nCR
¢¢
> 0. CV C is positive, but it is smaller than for Free information since nCR > n
F+
R . This
is apparent in Figure 3 from the fact that area B+ is thinner than in Figure 2. For Group S travel costs are higher
on Good days than with Free information (tC−S > t
−
R), but lower on Bad days (t
C+
S < t
F+
S ). Consequently, Group
S suﬀers less variability in costs – which is advantageous if they are risk averse as is the case in the general model.
3 No information and Free information with risk-averse drivers
This section establishes some properties of the No information and Free information regimes when drivers are risk
averse and examines the CV for Free information. Some of the results generalize results in de Palma and Picard
(2006), and other results are new. de Palma and Picard (2006) derive most of their results for CRRA and CARA
preferences. The results here are derived under Assumption 3, which includes CRRA and CARA as special cases
and permits more compact proofs.
3.1 Existence and uniqueness of equilibria
The equilibrium of the Free information regime is described by:
Proposition 2 Consider the Free information regime. Under Assumptions 1 and 2:
(a) On Good days there exists a unique corner equilibrium: (NF−R = N,N
F−
S = 0).
(b) On Bad days there exists a unique interior equilibrium: (NF+R ∈ (0, N) , N
F+
S = N−N
F+
R ), with t
+
¡
NF+R
¢
=
tS
¡
N −NF+R
¢
.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
On Good days all drivers prefer route R. This follows from Assumption 1 that t−R is constant and represents the
lowest possible travel time. On Bad days both routes are used and all drivers are indiﬀerent between them because
travel times are equal and there is no uncertainty. The equilibrium is the same as when drivers are risk-neutral
(Section 2).
To determine equilibrium for the No information regime it is necessary to identify which individuals take each
route. Individual route choice decisions are described by:
Lemma 1 Consider the No information regime. Under Assumptions 1-4, for any NR such that t+R (NR) >
tS (N −NR) and pt+R (NR) + (1− p) t
−
R < tS (N −NR):
(a) There exists a unique risk aversion threshold θ˜
Z
(p,NR) such that R Â S ⇔ θ < θ˜Z (p,NR).
(b) θ˜
Z
(p,NR) is strictly decreasing in p and NR.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
According to Lemma 1(a), whenever expected travel time is lower onR than on S a group of drivers with the least
risk aversion prefer to use R, and the remainder prefer S. The number who use route R is nZR = NF
³
θ˜
Z
(p,NR)
´
.
Lemma 1(b) indicates that nZR decreases with the probability of Bad days and with usage of R.
Equilibrium in the No information regime is described by:
10
Proposition 3 Consider the No information regime. Under Assumptions 1-4, there exists a unique equilibrium
traﬃc volume on R, nZR (p) ∈
¡
nF+R , N
¢
, and a unique risk aversion threshold, equal to θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢
, which solve:
⎧
⎨
⎩
(a)F−1
¡
nZR/N
¢
= θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢
(b) pU
³
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢´
+(1−p)U
³
t−R; θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢´
= U
³
tS
¡
N−nZR
¢
; θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢´ . (1)
Moreover, nZR (p) and θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢
are decreasing in p.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
The uniqueness of θ˜
Z
given nZR follows from Lemma 1. In words, part (a) of Proposition 3 states that drivers
with risk aversion less than θ˜
Z
choose route R and the rest choose S. Part (b) states that the driver with risk
aversion θ˜
Z
is indiﬀerent between the routes.
We now turn to a comparison of the No information and Free information regimes.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) With Free information, equilibrium usage of route R on Bad days is less than usage with No information:
nF+R < n
Z
R.
(b) Free information reduces expected travel time for all drivers, and the reduction is larger for the most risk -
averse drivers (θ > θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢
) than for the least risk -averse drivers (θ < θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢
): pt+R
¡
nF+R
¢
+ (1− p) t−R <
pt+R
¡
nZR
¢
+ (1− p) t−R < tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
.
(c) Free information reduces the variability of travel time for the least risk-averse drivers, and increases the
variability of travel time for the most risk-averse drivers.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Part (a) of Proposition 4 is a natural consequence of the fact that route R is impaired on Bad days while
route S is unaﬀected. Part (b) follows from the fact that with No information travel time is higher for the most
risk-averse drivers than for the least risk-averse drivers. With respect to Part (c) travel time variability is reduced
for the least risk-averse drivers because usage of route R is reduced on Bad days and travel time thus exceeds t−R
by a smaller amount. Travel time becomes more variable for other drivers because it does not vary at all with No
information.
The CV for Free information equalizes individual expected utility in the No information and Free information
regimes and is therefore driver-specific. Recall that with No information the nZR least risk-averse drivers choose
route R and incur a random travel time:
TR
¡
nZR
¢
=
(
t−R on Good days
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
on Bad days
,
and the N − nZR most risk-averse drivers choose route S with deterministic travel time tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
. In the Free
information regime, all users choose R on Good days (with travel time t−R) and are indiﬀerent between R and S on
Bad days since equilibrium traﬃc on R on Bad days, nF+R , is such that t
+
R
¡
nF+R
¢
= tS
¡
N − nF+R
¢
. The individual
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CVs for Free information for groups R and S, CV FR (θ) and CV
F
S (θ), therefore solve:
R (if θ < θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢
) :
pU
¡
t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
+ CV FR (θ) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R + CV
F
R (θ) ; θ
¢
=
pU
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢ ,
S (if θ > θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢
) :
pU
¡
t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
+ CV FS (θ) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R + CV
F
S (θ) ; θ
¢
=
U
¡
tS
¡
nZS
¢
; θ
¢ . (2)
The left-hand side of each equation in (2) is expected utility in the Free information regime with CV added to
travel time, and the right-hand side is expected utility in the No information regime. The pair of equations in (2)
is the counterpart to the equation CV F = ECZ − ECF for risk-neutral drivers.
According to Proposition 4, Free information reduces expected travel time for all drivers and the reduction
is larger for the most risk-averse drivers who choose route S. CV, however, exhibits a diﬀerent pattern. Under
Assumption 3, CV FR (θ) is an increasing function of θ and CV
F
S (θ) is a decreasing function of θ. CV is therefore
highest for drivers with risk aversion θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢
who are indiﬀerent between strategies R and S. Furthermore, CV
is negative for drivers who are suﬃciently risk averse. (This follows intuitively from the definition of CV FS (θ) and
the fact that t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
= tS
¡
nF+S
¢
> tS
¡
nZS
¢
so that drivers who take the safe route fare worse on Bad days when
information is provided.) These results are formalized in:
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) The CV for Free information is an increasing function of risk aversion for the least risk-averse drivers who
take route R with No information, and a decreasing function of risk aversion for the most risk-averse drivers who
take route S with No information.
(b) When the risk aversion parameter is distributed over R+, the CV for Free information is negative for the
most risk-averse users.
Proof. Part (a) is proved in Appendix 7. Part (b) is proved in Appendix 8.
The most risk-averse drivers take the safe route in the No information regime. They gain and lose from Free
information. They gain on Good days because they can save time by shifting to the risky route. But they lose on
Bad days because some of the least risk-averse drivers shift onto the safe route. This increases travel time on the
safe route and also increases the variability of travel time that the most risk-averse drivers experience. The benefit
on Good days outweighs the loss on Bad days for drivers with intermediate levels of risk aversion. (Recall from
Section 3 that this is true of all drivers if drivers are risk-neutral.) But for the very most risk-averse drivers the
benefit is outweighed by the loss.
The possibility that providing (better) information about travel conditions on a congested road network can
make users worse oﬀ is not new. It has been demonstrated in models with endogenous numbers of trips (e.g.,
Arnott et al., 1996; de Palma and Lindsey, 1998) and with endogenous departure times (e.g., Arnott et al., 1991)
as well as endogenous route choice when drivers overreact to information (e.g., Schelling, 1978; Ben-Akiva, de Palma
and Kaysi, 1991; Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan, 1991). None of these papers features risk aversion. Emmerink
et al. (1998) use a model that does incorporate risk aversion by including in the generalized cost function a
term proportional to the standard deviation of travel time. They show that in regimes equivalent to the Free
information and Costly information regimes, information makes all drivers better oﬀ. However, if an exogenous
fraction of drivers is informed the uninformed can be worse oﬀ if the cost of travel time variation is suﬃciently
large. In their model this happens because elimination of uncertainty encourages informed drivers to travel more.
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The basic mechanism whereby drivers can be worse oﬀ is similar to the mechanism here although details diﬀer (in
their model and example, individuals are homogeneous with respect to risk aversion, the proportion of users who
are informed is exogenous, demand and travel cost functions are linear, and the number of trips is endogenous
rather than route choice).
In the model here free information is individually welfare-reducing when it induces changes in driver behaviour
that exacerbate congestion in a particular way. The expected private benefit that an individual derives from ad-
justing his or her route choice on the basis of daily travel conditions can be outweighed by the eﬀects of adjustments
by other drivers. As the next section demonstrates, this is also possible if drivers have to pay for information.
4 Costly information with risk-averse drivers
The Costly information regime is more complicated than the No information regime since drivers can choose
between three strategies (R, S and I) rather than just two (R and S). Similar to the approach taken for the No
information regime, equilibrium will be derived in two steps. In the first step, an individual driver’s strategy choice
for information acquisition and route selection is derived while holding fixed the numbers of drivers who adopt
each strategy (i.e. nR, nS and nI). For the second step, the sets of drivers choosing each strategy and thus the
equilibrium values of nR, nS and nI are determined given the individual strategy choices derived in step 1.
4.1 Driver strategy choice with exogenous traﬃc
The first step is to derive an individual driver’s choice between strategies R, S and I as a function of θ, the price of
information, π, and traﬃc conditions (nR, nS , nI). If a driver is not informed, the choice is restricted to strategies
R and S. The preference ranking between R and S is described by the condition:
R Â S ⇔ pU ¡t+R (nR) ; θ¢+ (1− p)U ¡t−R; θ¢ > pU (tS (nS + nI) ; θ) + (1− p)U (tS (nS) ; θ) ,
where the expected utilities of R and S are as given in Table 2. Rearranging terms, this condition can be written
in terms of the diﬀerence in utilities:
R Â S ⇔ ψRS (θ; p, nR, nS , nI) ≡
p
£
U
¡
t+R (nR) ; θ
¢
− U (tS (nS + nI) ; θ)
¤
+(1− p)
£
U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
− U (tS (nS) ; θ)
¤ > 0.
Naturally, for given nI this condition does not depend on the price of information – although if π is small enough
a driver may prefer strategy I to either R or S. The properties of the preference ranking between R and S are
described in:
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) There exists a unique risk aversion threshold θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) such that R Â S ⇔ θ < θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI).
(b) For θˆRS <∞, θˆRS is decreasing in p and nR, and increasing in nS and nI .
Proof. See Appendix 9.
Lemma 2 is the counterpart to Lemma 1 for Zero information. The threshold θˆRS is a decreasing function of p
and nR for the same reason that θ˜
Z
is decreasing. θˆRS is increasing in nS and nI because the safe route becomes
less attractive.
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The preference ranking between strategies R and I is described by the condition:
R Â I ⇔ pU ¡t+R (nR) ; θ¢+ (1− p)U ¡t−R; θ¢ > pU (tS (nS + nI) + π; θ) + (1− p)U ¡t−R + π; θ¢ ,
which is equivalent to:
R Â I ⇔ ψRI (θ, π; p, nR, nS + nI) ≡
p
£
U
¡
t+R (nR) ; θ
¢
− U (tS (nS + nI) + π; θ)
¤
+(1− p)
£
U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
− U
¡
t−R + π; θ
¢¤ > 0.
Note that this condition depends on the combined numbers of drivers who choose Strategies S and I, nS + nI .
It does not depend independently on nS and nI because Strategies R and I diﬀer only in the Bad state where
drivers choosing Strategies S and I all take route S. The properties of the preference ranking between R and I are
described in:
Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) There exists a unique risk aversion threshold θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI) such that R Â I ⇔ θ < θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI).
(b) For θˆRI <∞, θˆRI is decreasing in p and nR, and increasing in π and nS + nI .
Proof. See Appendix 10.
The comparative statics properties of θˆRI are similiar to those of θˆRS in Lemma 2. θˆRI is increasing in π
because Strategy I becomes less attractive as the cost of information rises. The preference ranking for the final
pair of strategies, I and S, is:
I Â S ⇔ pU(tS(nS + nI) + π; θ) + (1−p)U
¡
t−R + π; θ
¢
> pU(tS(nS + nI) ; θ) + (1−p)U(tS(nS) ; θ) ,
or
I Â S ⇔ ψIS (θ, π; p, nS , nI) ≡
p [U(tS(nS + nI) + π; θ)− U(tS(nS + nI) ; θ)]
+ (1−p)
£
U
¡
t−R + π; θ
¢
− U(tS(nS) ; θ)
¤ > 0.
The properties of the preference ranking between I and S are given in
Lemma 4 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) There exists a unique risk aversion threshold θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI) such that I Â S ⇔ θ < θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI).
(b) For θˆIS <∞, θˆIS is decreasing in π, p and nI , independent of nR, of ambiguous sign in nS, but increasing
in nS with nS + nI held fixed.
Proof. See Appendix 11.
To see why threshold θˆIS is independent of nR note that users of Strategy S never take route R, while users of
Strategy I take it only on Good days when travel time is independent of usage.
Figure 4 about here
Figure 4 depicts the combinations of (θ, π) for which drivers choose strategy R, S or I when traﬃc conditions
are fixed. Along the boundary labelled R ≈ S, ψRS = 0 and drivers are indiﬀerent between R and S. The boundary
between regions R and I where R ≈ I, and the boundary between regions I and S where I ≈ S, are interpreted
similarly. The locations of the indiﬀerence curves depicted in Figure 4 are described by the following two remarks.
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Remark 1 When R Â S, the curve R ≈ I lies below the curve I ≈ S. When S Â R, the curve R ≈ I lies above
the curve I ≈ S.
Proof. Transitivity of preferences implies that, when R Â S and I ≈ S, then R Â I and the curve R ≈ I is located
at a lower π. Similarly, when S Â R and I ≈ S, then R ≺ I and the curve R ≈ I is located at a higher π.
Remark 1 confirms that the decision whether to become informed involves a comparison between I and R for
the least risk-averse drivers, and a comparison between I and S for the most risk-averse drivers.
Remark 2 When π = θ = 0, I Â S and either R Â I or I Â R depending on the value of nR.
Proof. When θ = 0, U (t; 0) = − (a+ t) by Assumption 3. If π = 0 as well, then
ψIS (θ = 0, π = 0; p, nS , nI) = (1− p)
£
tS (nS)− t−R
¤
> 0, and
ψRI (θ = 0, π = 0; p, nR, nS + nI) = p
£
tS (nS + nI)− t+R (nR)
¤ ≷ 0.
Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 lead to:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1-4, for any (p, nR, nS , nI) there exists a unique price bπ (p, nR, nS , nI) > 0,
a unique risk aversion threshold θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) and two functions θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI) and θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI)
respectively increasing and decreasing in π such that:
θˆRI (bπ (p, nR, nS , nI) , p, nR, nS + nI) = θˆIS (bπ (p, nR, nS , nI) , p, nS , nI) = θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) .
A driver selects strategy R if θ<θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) and θ<θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI); selects S if θ>θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI)
and θ>θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI), and selects I if θ>θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI) and θ<θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI). For θˆRS < ∞, θˆRS is
decreasing in p and nR, and increasing in nS and nI . For θˆRI <∞, θˆRI is decreasing in p and nR, and increasing
in π and nS + nI . For θˆIS < ∞, θˆIS is decreasing in π, p and nI , independent of nR, of ambiguous sign in nS,
but increasing in nS with nS + nI held fixed.
4.2 Driver strategy choice and equilibrium
Proposition 5 characterizes individual driver strategy choices with Costly information for given traﬃc conditions.
The analysis now proceeds to the derivation of equilibrium values of nCR, n
C
S and n
C
I as functions of π. The first
step is to establish a critical price for information above which no driver chooses to be informed.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1-4, for any probability p ∈ (0, 1) and any N > 0, there exists a unique
price πC (p,N), a unique risk aversion threshold θC0 (p,N), and a unique traﬃc equilibrium (nCR0 (p,N), n
C
S0 =
N − nCR0 (p,N),nCI0 = 0) such that the three indiﬀerence curves R ≈ S, R ≈ I and I ≈ S cross at
³
θC0 , πC
´
.
Functions θC0 (p,N) and nCR0 (p,N) are decreasing in p.
Proof. See Appendix 12.
Proposition 6 establishes the existence of a critical price for information, πC (p,N), at and above which no driver
chooses to be informed, and the equilibrium with Costly information is therefore the same as with No information.
Consequently, θC0 (p,N) = θ˜
Z ¡
p, nZR
¢
. It remains to establish existence of equilibrium when π < πC (p,N).
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Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1-4, for any probability p ∈ (0, 1), any N > 0 and any price π ≥ 0, there exists
a unique equilibrium nCR (π, p,N) , n
C
S (π, p,N) , n
C
I (π, p,N) = N − nCR (π, p,N) − nCS (π, p,N). If π ≥ πC (p,N),
the equilibrium is as described in Proposition 6 . If π < πC (p,N), there exist unique risk aversion thresholds,
θA (π, p,N) and θB (π, p,N) > θA (π, p,N), such that a driver with θ < θA (π, p,N) selects Strategy R, a driver
with θ ∈ (θA (π, p,N) , θB (π, p,N)) selects Strategy I, and a driver with θ > θB (π, p,N) selects Strategy S. The
comparative statics properties of nCR, n
C
S , n
C
I , θA and θB are given in Table 5.
Proof. See Appendix 13.
Comparative statics properties of the equilibrium shown in Table 5 are derived in Appendix 14.
π p N
nR > 0 < 0 ∈ (0, 1)
nS ? > 0 ?
nI ? ? ?
θA > 0 < 0 ?
θB ? < 0 ?
Table 5: Comparative statics properties of Costly information equilibrium with risk-averse drivers
Comparison of Table 5 with Table 4 reveals three diﬀerences in the properties of equilibria with risk-averse
drivers and risk-neutral drivers. First, if the cost of information is positive, suﬃciently risk-averse drivers eschew
buying it and adopt strategy S instead. By contrast, if drivers are risk neutral none choose strategy S if information
is relatively cheap. Second, nS depends on N whereas with risk neutrality it is independent of N . Third, several
of the comparative statics properties are ambiguous in sign including all three of the derivatives for nI . Indeed, it
is not possible to rule out that the number of drivers who purchase information is a (locally) increasing function
of the price although it seems highly unlikely that this will be the case.
Given Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 it is possible to draw Figure 5, which is the counterpart to Figure 4 with¡
nCR, n
C
S , n
C
I
¢
set at their equilibrium values. Individual preference rankings for the information regimes are:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
R Â S ⇔ ϕRS (θ, π; p,N) > 0,
R Â I ⇔ ϕRI (θ, π; p,N) > 0,
I Â S ⇔ ϕIS (θ, π; p,N) > 0,
where ⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ϕRS (θ, π; p,N) = ψRS
¡
θ; p, nCR (π, p,N) , n
C
S (π, p,N) , n
C
I (π, p,N)
¢
,
ϕRI (θ, π; p,N) = ψRI
¡
θ, π; p, nCR (π, p,N) , n
C
S (π, p,N) + n
C
I (π, p,N)
¢
,
ϕIS (θ, π; p,N) = ψIS
¡
θ, π; p, nCS (π, p,N) , n
C
I (π, p,N)
¢
.
Figure 5 about here
The equilibrium threshold for π ≥ πC (p,N) is θC0 (p,N) = θˆRS
¡
p, nCR0, n
C
S0, 0
¢
, and for π < πC (p,N) the thresholds
are: (
θA (π, p,N) = θˆRI
¡
π, p, nCR (π, p,N) , n
C
S (π, p,N) + n
C
I (π, p,N)
¢
,
θB (π, p,N) = θˆIS
¡
π, p, nCS (π, p,N) , n
C
I (π, p,N)
¢
.
In the limit as π → 0, θB →∞. Usage of the two routes is continuous at π = 0, and hence travel times, expected
utilities and CVs are continuous as well.
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4.3 Welfare eﬀects of Costly information
Four groups of drivers must be distinguished in assessing the welfare eﬀects of Costly information. As shown in
Figure 6, in order of increasing risk aversion these are: drivers who choose strategy R in both the No information
and the Costly information regimes, drivers who choose R with No information and I with Costly information,
drivers who choose S with No information and I with Costly information, and finally drivers who choose S in both
regimes. The four groups will be called RR, RI, SI and SS respectively, and their CVs denoted CV CRR, CV
C
RI ,
CV CSI and CV
C
SS . CV is defined by a diﬀerent equation for each group:
RR (if θ < θA) :
pU
¡
t+R
¡
nCR
¢
+ CV CRR (θ) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R + CV
C
RR (θ) ; θ
¢
= pU
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
.
RI (if θA < θ < θC0 ) :
pU
¡
tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
+ π + CV CRI (θ) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R + π + CV
C
RI (θ) ; θ
¢
= pU
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
.
SI (if θC0 < θ < θB) :
pU
¡
tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
+ π + CV CSI (θ) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R + π + CV
C
SI (θ) ; θ
¢
= U
¡
tS
¡
nZS
¢
; θ
¢
.
SS (if θ > θB) :
pU
¡
tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
+ CV CSS (θ) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
tS
¡
nCS
¢
+ CV CSS (θ) ; θ
¢
= U
¡
tS
¡
nZS
¢
; θ
¢
.
(3)
The left-hand side of each equation in (3) is expected utility with Costly information, and the right-hand side is
expected utility with No information. Note that the cost of information, π, is added to CV CRI and CV
C
SI for groups
RI and SI which purchase information so that their CVs are defined as net of π. As formalized in Theorem 2
below, CV CRR (θ) and CV
C
RI (θ) are increasing functions of θ, and CV
C
SI (θ) and CV
C
SS (θ) are decreasing functions
of θ. Consequently, CV is highest for drivers who are indiﬀerent between strategies R and S in the No information
regime in the same way that CV for Free information is highest for the indiﬀerent driver. CV is also negative for
drivers who are suﬃciently risk averse.
Figure 6 about here
The CVs for Costly information and Free information can be ranked by comparing the defining equations in
(2) and (3):
CV CRR (θ) < CV
F
R (θ) since n
C+
R > n
F+
R ,
CV CRI (θ) ≷ CV FR (θ)
CV CSI (θ) ≷ CV FS (θ)
)
depending on π and the relative magnitudes of tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
and t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
,
CV CSS (θ) ≷ CV FS (θ) depending on the magnitudes of t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
, tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
, tS
¡
nCS
¢
and t−R.
CV for group RR is unambiguously smaller for Costly information than for Free information because fewer drivers
shift oﬀ route R in the Bad state. But no general ranking is possible for the other three groups. These results are
formalized in Theorem 2 which is the counterpart to Theorem 1 for Free information:
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions 1-4:
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(a) The CV for Costly information, CV C (θ), is an increasing function of risk aversion for the least risk-averse
drivers who take route R with No information, and a decreasing function of risk aversion for the most risk-averse
drivers who take route S with No information.
(b) When the risk aversion parameter is distributed over R+, CV C (θ) < 0 for the most risk-averse drivers.
(c) CV C (θ) < CV F (θ) for the least risk-averse drivers who take route R in both the No information and Costly
information regimes. For other drivers the ranking of CV C (θ) and CV F (θ) is ambiguous.
Proof. Part (a) is proved in Appendix 7, and Part(b) is proved in Appendix 8. Part (c) was proved in the text.
5 Private information
As the cost of information rises towards πC (p,N) the number of drivers who purchase information approaches
zero and information eﬀectively becomes private in the sense that only a few drivers exploit it. As explained in
Section 2, the Costly information equilibrium approaches the equilibrium with No information and the CV for
Costly information (gross of the cost) approaches the CV for Private information. The CVs of Groups R and S
for Private information, CV IR (θ) and CV
I
S (θ) respectively, are defined by the conditions:
R (if θ < θRS) :
pU
¡
tS
¡
nZS
¢
+ CV IR (θ) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R + CV
I
R (θ) ; θ
¢
=
pU
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
.
S (if θ > θRS) :
pU
¡
tS
¡
nZS
¢
+ CV IS (θ) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R + CV
I
S (θ) ; θ
¢
=
U
¡
tS
¡
nZS
¢
; θ
¢
.
(4)
Since t+R
¡
nZR
¢
> tS
¡
nZS
¢
, CV IR (θ) > 0, and since tS
¡
nZS
¢
> t−R, CV
I
S (θ) > 0. The CV for Private information is
therefore unambiguously positive. Given Assumption 3, CV IR (θ) is an increasing function of θ, and CV
I
S (θ) is a
decreasing function of θ so that, once again, CV is highest for drivers with risk aversion θRS who are indiﬀerent
between strategies R and S with No information.
By comparing (4) with (2) and (3), it is clear that the CV for Private information is larger than the CV for
either Free information or Costly information:
CV IR (θ) > CV
F
R (θ) and CV
I
S (θ) > CV
F
S (θ) since tS
¡
nZS
¢
< tS
¡
nF+S
¢
= t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
,
CV IR (θ) > CV
C
RR (θ) and CV
I
R (θ) > CV
C
RI (θ) since tS
¡
nZS
¢
< tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
< t+R
¡
nCR
¢
,
CV IS (θ) > CV
C
SI (θ) and CV
I
S (θ) > CV
C
SS (θ) since tS
¡
nZS
¢
< tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
and t−R < tS
¡
nCS
¢
.
These results are formalized in
Theorem 3 Under Assumptions 1-4:
(a) The CV for Private information is positive for all drivers: CV I (θ) > 0.
(b) The CV for Private information exceeds the CV for either Free information or Costly information: CV I (θ) >
CV F (θ) and CV I (θ) > CV C (θ).
(c) The CV for Private information is an increasing function of risk aversion for the least risk-averse drivers
who take route R with No information, and a decreasing function of risk aversion for the most risk-averse drivers
who take route S with No information.
Proof. Parts (a) and (b) are proved in the text. Part (c) is proved in Appendix 7.
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Private information is more valuable to an individual than is Costly information or Free information because
the benefits from selecting the quicker route diminish as more drivers exploit the information. Diminishing returns
of this sort have been identified in a number of studies of ATIS with exogenous or endogenous market penetration
(e.g., Emmerink, 1998; Yang, 1998). In the model here the negative external eﬀects of information arise not only
because the route choice decisions of informed drivers raise travel times for other informed drivers, but also because
they contribute to uncertainty in travel times. This impact is especially pernicious for the most risk-averse drivers
who try to avoid uncertainty by sticking to the “safe” route. However, uninformed and less risk-averse drivers who
take the risky route benefit when informed drivers switch to the safer route on Bad days.
An interesting property of the model is that the CV for Private information for the drivers with risk aversion
θRS who value it most is strictly positive even in the limit as the probability of Bad days decreases to zero. This
result is formalized in:
Proposition 8 If Assumption 3 holds, and the risk -aversion parameter is distributed over R+, then as the prob-
ability of Bad days decreases to zero the maximum CV for Private information approaches from above a limiting
value of Min
¡
t+R (N)− tS (0) , tS (0)− t
−
R
¢
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix 15.
An intuitive explanation of sorts for Prop. 8 runs as follows. With No information a driver must choose between
Strategy R and Strategy S. If he chooses R, and Private information then becomes available, he can occasionally
save t+R (N)− tS (0) in travel time. (Note that in the limit p→ 0 all drivers take route R.) Since this is a recovery
from the worst state (a Bad day) an extremely risk-averse driver is willing to pay nearly t+R (N) − tS (0) for the
information even though it will be exploited only rarely. If the driver chooses Strategy S instead, and Private
information becomes available, he can almost always save tS (0)− t−R in travel time. Since this is a gain in the good
state (a Good day) the driver is willing to pay nearly tS (0) − t−R for the information. Now the driver’s expected
utility with Private information is a given amount. Hence the driver will eﬀectively choose between strategies R
and S according to which willingness to pay is smaller. Hence the actual CV for Private information is the lesser
of t+R (N)− tS (0) and tS (0)− t
−
R.
Prop. 8 contrasts with Theorems 1 and 2 which establish that the CVs for Free information and Costly
information are negative for very risk-averse individuals. This highlights the contrast between the values of public
and private information that was demonstrated by Hirshleifer (1971) in the context of speculative activity. It also
suggests that there may be a niche demand for ATIS by highly risk-averse travelers even if travel conditions are
fairly predictable.
6 Numerical example
The numerical example is representative of a commuting corridor. Travel time functions for the safe route and the
risky route on Bad days have a Bureau of Public Roads form:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
tS (nS) = τS
∙
1 +
³
nS
KS
´b¸
,
t+R (nR) = τ
+
R
∙
1 +
³
nR
KR
´b¸
,
(5)
where τS and τ+R are free-flow travel times, KS andKR are capacities, and b is a parameter. For the base case of the
example the probability of a Bad day is p = 0.2 and the number of drivers is N = 10, 000. Other parameter values
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are τS = 25 min., τ+R = 25 min., t
−
R = 20 min., KS = 10, 000 per hr., KR = 8, 000 per hr. and b = 2. Drivers have
CARA preferences and θ has a log-logistic distribution with parameter θ¯ = 2; i.e. F (θ) = θ/
¡
θ + θ¯
¢
= θ/ (θ + 2).
(The value of θ¯ is based on estimates in de Palma and Picard (2005).) With these parameter values Assumptions
1-4 are all satisfied.
6.1 Base-case results
Summary statistics for the equilibria with the base-case parameterization are listed in Column 1 of Table 6.
6.1.1 No information
For the No information regime nZR = 6, 654: about two thirds of drivers (those with θ < θRS = 3.98) choose the
risky route. Travel time on the risky route is t−R = 20 min. on Good days, and t
+Z
R = 42.3 min. on Bad days.
Travel time on the safe route is tS = 27.8 min. in both states. Expected travel time is (1− p) t−R + pt
Z+
R = 24.46
min. for group R, and 27.8 min. for group S. Group S therefore incurs more than three min. extra mean travel
time for the privilege of travel time reliability.
6.1.2 Free information
With Free information all drivers take route R on Good days (nF−R = 10, 000) whereas less than half of them do on
Bad days (nF+R = 4, 444). The 4:5 division of traﬃc between the two routes is independent of the distribution of
risk preferences, and the set of drivers who take Route R on Bad days is indeterminate because travel time is known
in advance. All drivers experience the same travel times of t−R = 20 min. on Good days, and t
F+
R = t
F+
S = 32.72
min. on Bad days. Expected travel time is 22.54 min.: a drop from the No information regime of 1.92 min. for
Group R, and 5.26 min. for Group S. Average CVs are 2.60 min. for Group R, and 1.38 min. for Group S.
Thus, although Group S experiences a much larger average reduction in travel time as per Proposition 4, Group
S benefits less from Free information in terms of CV.
CV for Free information, CV F (θ), is plotted in Figure 7. (The other seven curves are discussed later.) Con-
sistent with Theorem 1, CV F (θ) reaches a maximum at θRS = 3.98, and then drops – eventually below zero.
Nearly 10 percent of the most risk averse users (with θ > 18.7) and over a quarter of Group S end up worse oﬀ.
This is consistent with Theorem 2(b) that suﬃciently risk-averse drivers are worse oﬀ with Free information.
Figure 7 about here
6.1.3 Costly information
The numerical counterpart to Figure 5 for the Costly information regime is shown in Figure 8. As the cost of
information rises from 0 to the choke price of πC (p,N) = CV I (θRS) = 5.88, the number of drivers purchasing
information drops steadily to zero. Figure 9 shows how the fractions of drivers in each of the four groups evolve
with π. As expected, the two groups that acquire information (RI and SI) decline steadily in size towards zero,
whereas Groups RR and SS grow. The fraction of drivers who are worse oﬀ decreases with π because fewer drivers
are informed and there is less variation in travel time on route S.
Figure 8 about here
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Figure 10 presents the CV for Costly information by group. The two informed groups always fare better than
do the uninformed, and their benefits increase as information becomes cheaper except when the price nears zero.
As far as the two uninformed groups, the benefits to Group RR increase monotonically as information becomes
cheaper. Group SS gains as well while information is expensive, but it loses out once information becomes cheaper.
Nevertheless, the aggregate benefits for the two uninformed groups increase steadily because Group SS shrinks in
size. Overall, the pattern is one in which most drivers benefit from information while a small minority of highly
risk-averse drivers suﬀer appreciably.
Figure 9 about here
Figure 7 plots the CVs for Free information, Costly information and Private information as functions of π.
Consistent with Theorems 1, 2 and 3, all three CVs reach their maxima at θ = θRS . And consistent with Theorem
3, CV I (θ) exceeds CV F (θ) and CV C (θ, π) over the whole range of π. The behaviour of CV C (θ, π) is rather
complex. In the lower range of θ, CV C (θ, π) is bounded between 0 and CV F (θ) and decreases monotonically with
π. For larger values of θ, CV C (π, θ) > CV F (θ) because highly risk-averse drivers benefit from the fact that with
Costly information fewer drivers shift to the safe route on Bad days. CV C (π, θ) varies non-monotonically with π:
it rises initially, but eventually declines towards zero as the number of informed drivers diminishes and with it the
potential for information to be beneficial. However, part (b) of Theorem 2 guarantees that some drivers are worse
oﬀ as long as π < πC (p,N).
Figure 10 about here
6.1.4 Sensitivity analysis
Probability of Bad days Figure 11 shows how the eﬀects of Free information evolve with p (the base-case value
of p = 0.2 is marked by the vertical dashed line). Over most of the range p ∈ [0, 0.5] the mean travel time saving
and CV decrease for Group S, and increase for Group R. In the limit as p → 0 the eﬀects on Group R decrease
to zero as expected. For Group S the travel time reduction is greatest when p is close to zero since Group S is
almost always able to save time by taking route R rather than route S. As p rises travel time savings for Group S
drop, and so does its CV since Group R shifts more frequently to route S and increases travel time there.
Figure 11 about here
Distribution of risk aversion If parameter θ¯ of the log-logistic distribution is reduced to zero, the population
degenerates to a set of N identical risk-neutral drivers such as considered in Section 2. Equilibria for this case
are shown in Column 2 of Table 6. Compared to the base case, the fraction of drivers taking route R with No
information increases from roughly 2/3 to 4/5, and the diﬀerence in travel times on R and S on Bad days is
accentuated. This is because drivers are not averse to travel time variability on route R. (Chen et al. (2002)
obtain a similar result.) Mean travel time savings and CVs all coincide at 3.46 min., and all drivers benefit from
Free information by this amount. Figure 12 shows that as parameter θ¯ rises from 0 through the base case value
of θ¯ = 2 and upwards, mean travel time saving and CV FR fall slowly for Group R. In contrast, for Group S mean
travel time saving rises and CV FS drops rather sharply so that the divergence between travel time saving and CV
is much greater than for Group R. (To see why, note that with greater risk aversion in the population a larger
fraction of drivers take route S with No information. With Free information these drivers enjoy a greater time
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saving from taking route R on Good days, but they also suﬀer a greater cost from travel time variability on route
S.) Consistent with this, the fraction of drivers made worse oﬀ by Free information rises from zero at θ¯ = 0 to
more than 20 percent at θ¯ = 8.
Figure 12 about here
Other variations Raising the number of drivers from N = 10, 000 to N = 15, 000 (see Column 3 in Table 6)
increases the eﬀects of Free information as expected, with the interesting exception that the mean CV for Group
S decreases slightly. This is attributable to the fact that with Free information travel time on the safe route varies
by 42.36− 34.11 = 8.25 min. compared to only 32.72− 27.80 = 4.92 min. in the base case.
Reducing the capacity of route R on Bad days from KR = 8, 000 to KR = 4, 000 (see Column 4) results in
travel times on Bad days with No information similar to the travel times in Column 3. But the benefits from Free
information are generally larger because the variation in performance of route R is more pronounced.
In Column 5 parameter b of the travel time function is reduced from 2 to 1. This increases the divergence
between mean travel time reduction and CV for group S, and increases the fraction of drivers made worse oﬀ by
Free information. This is because with linear travel costs more drivers take route R with No information, and
Free information has a bigger impact in shifting drivers to route S on Bad days. Raising parameter b to 4 has the
mirror image eﬀect of reducing the fraction made worse oﬀ to about 4 percent.
In Column 6 the free-flow travel time on Route R, τ+R, is reduced from 25 min. to 20 min. to match the
free-flow travel time on Good days, τ−R. (This violates the strict inequality t
−
R < t
+
R (0) in Assumption 2, but does
not invalidate the equilibrium.) Usage of Route R expands considerably in both the No information and Free
information regimes. The welfare eﬀects of information are slightly smaller than in the base case, but follow the
same pattern. As in Column 5, more drivers take route R. But the shift from R to S on Bad days is reduced
because τ+R is smaller.
The final “extreme” case (with N = 15, 000, b = 1, p = 0.5 and θ¯ = 8) combines several of the one-way
parameter variations in a direction that accentuates the adverse eﬀects of Free information. Doing so does not
aﬀect greatly the average CV for group R, but it does result in a negative average CV for Group S (CV FS = −0.21)
and losses for nearly 30 percent of all drivers. This illustrates rather dramatically that even with heavy congestion,
a high probability of capacity loss, and a large proportion of highly risk-averse drivers, information is not necessarily
very beneficial. Adverse eﬀects of information may be even worse from a welfare-distributional point of view since
it is plausible that drivers with a high level of risk aversion (those using the safe route) are also drivers with low
income (see empirical findings in de Palma and Picard, 2005). In such a case, information has a regressive eﬀect
since it aﬀects negatively low-income people (and positively high-income people).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Base
case
Risk
neutral
N =
15000
KR =
4000
b = 1 τ+R = 20
Extreme
case†
No information equilibrium
nZR 6,654 8,000 8,963 4,665 7,144 9,117 7,551
nZS 3,346 2,000 6,037 5,335 2,856 883 7,449
tZ+R 42.30 50.00 56.38 59.01 47.32 37.45 48.60
tS 27.80 26.00 34.11 32.11 32.14 26.60 43.62
Free information equilibrium
nF+R 4,444 4,444 6,667 2,857 4,444 5,607 6,667
nF+S 5,556 5,556 8,333 7,143 5,556 4,393 8,333
tF+R = t
F+
S 32.72 32.72 42.36 37.76 38.89 29.82 45.83
Impacts of Free information
Mean travel time
red’n for group R
1.92 3.46 2.80 4.25 1.69 1.52 1.38
Mean travel time
red’n for group S
5.26 3.46 9.64 8.56 8.36 4.63 10.71
Mean CV FR
for group R
2.60 3.46 4.21 5.53 2.68 2.08 2.10
Mean CV FS
for group S
1.38 3.46 1.31 3.92 0.29 1.50 -0.21
Mean CV F
for all drivers
2.19 3.46 3.05 4.67 1.99 1.94 0.96
Max. CV F (θRS) 4.26 3.46 7.24 7.75 5.32 3.73 2.69
% drivers worse oﬀ 9.64 0 15.06 10.62 12.60 6.38 29.85
Private information
Max. CV I (θRS) 5.88 4.80 10.39 9.32 8.54 4.89 4.83
Table 6: Eﬀects of Free information: Sensitivity analysis
† N = 15, 000, b = 1, p = 0.5, θ¯ = 8
Information can be welfare-reducing In the “extreme” case just considered Group S has a negative aggregate
CV for Free information, but its losses are outweighed by the gains for Group R. It is also possible for the aggregate
CV of all drivers to be negative. An example can be constructed by relaxing Assumption 4 and considering two
groups of drivers: Group 1 with N1 risk-neutral individuals (θ1 = 0), and Group 2 with N2 infinitely risk-
averse individuals (θ2 = ∞). For a range of parameter values all Group 1 adopts Strategy R, and all Group 2
adopts Strategy S. With No information, travel times are then tZS = τS
∙
1 +
³
N2
KS
´b¸
, tZ−R = τ
−
R and t
Z+
R =
τ+R
∙
1 +
³
N1
KR
´b¸
. Group 1 prefers Route R provided (1− p) τ−R + pt
Z+
R < t
Z
S , and Group 2 prefers Route S
provided tZS < t
Z+
R . With Free information the division of drivers between routes on Bad days is determined by the
condition that travel times on Routes R and S are equal: tF+R = t
F+
S , or τ
+
R
∙
1 +
³
nF+R
KR
´b¸
= τS
∙
1 +
³
N−nF+R
KS
´b¸
.
Given tZS < t
Z+
R , this implies t
Z
S < t
F+
S = t
F+
R < t
Z+
R . CVs are CV
F
R =.p
¡
tZ+R − t
F+
R
¢
> 0 for Group 1, and
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CV FS =
¡
tZS − tF+S
¢
< 0 for Group 2. The total CV for all drivers is CVtot = N1p
¡
tZ+R − t
F+
R
¢
+N2
¡
tZS − tF+S
¢
. None
of the travel times depends on parameter p. And the route choice condition for Group 1, (1− p) τ−R + pt
Z+
R < t
Z
S ,
is necessarily satisfied in the limit p → 0 since τ−R < tZS . Hence Limp→0CVtot = N2
¡
tZS − tF+S
¢
< 0. Thus, if Bad
days are suﬃciently rare, Free information is welfare-reducing as measured by the sum of compensating variations.
By continuity, CVtot is also negative if Assumption 4 holds and the distribution of θ is bimodal with peaks at 0
and some large number. CVtot is also negative if Group 2 has a finite but suﬃciently high degree of risk aversion.
For example, with θ2 = 120, N1 = 5, 000, N2 = 5, 000 and other parameters set at their base-case values for
the numerical example, CVtot = −1, 257 which is -2.8 percent of the aggregate travel time savings from Free
information.
7 Conclusions and extensions
This paper studies the information-acquisition and route-choice decisions of risk-averse drivers on a simple road
network with one “safe” route and one “risky” route. Four information regimes are considered: No information,
Free information – which is publicly available at no cost, Costly information – which is publicly available for a
fee, and Private information – which is available free to a single individual.
Several general theoretical results are derived. First, it is drivers with intermediate levels of risk aversion who
purchase information in order to select the quickest route each day. The least risk-averse drivers remain uninformed
and take the risky route every day, while the most risk-averse drivers take the safe route every day. This pattern
mirrors a finding of Emmerink et al. (1996) that it is individuals with intermediate demands for travel who gain
the most from information because travel is worthwhile for them under some conditions but not others.
Second, Private information is always beneficial to an individual driver relative to No information, and the
benefit from Private information exceeds the benefit from Free information or Costly information. Third, Free
information and Costly information benefit drivers who are risk neutral or moderately risk averse. But very risk-
averse drivers end up worse oﬀ even though some of them may be willing to pay for the information. A numerical
example suggests that losers are likely to comprise a relatively small fraction of the population, but also that their
losses as measured by CV can be comparable to the highest gains of other drivers (cf. Figure 10). Moreover, if a
large proportion of the population is highly risk-averse it is possible for the aggregate CV of drivers to be negative
so that the potential losers could – in principle – bribe the potential winners not to implement an ATIS.
The analysis could be extended in various directions. One is to examine more complex road networks. The
two-route network with one safe route has the advantage of being analytically tractable. And it is a natural choice
to demonstrate the potential drawbacks of public information for highly risk-averse drivers. But real applications
of ATIS are likely to involve multiple links and routes. Furthermore, the property of the model that information is
most valuable to drivers with intermediate risk aversion is counterintuitive insofar as the benefits from information
would seem, a priori, to be greatest for the most risk-averse individuals. In part, this result is driven by the
assumptions that demand is inelastic and that there is a safe route with superior “worst-case” properties than the
other route.
A second extension is to consider alternatives to the expected utility paradigm. Empirical evidence has been
accumulating at least since Allais (1953) that contradicts expected utility theory, and in recent years Prospect
Theory and other non-expected utilities have been applied in transportation research. Nevertheless, there are several
reasons why these alternatives do not (at least yet) oﬀer a clearly superior paradigm to expected utility theory for
analyzing traveler decisions of the sort considered here. See the discussion in de Palma et al. (2008). First, route-
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choice decision-making diﬀers substantially from gambling on monetary values, and it is not obvious that similar
behavioral patterns apply in the two contexts. Moreover, it is not clear what is an appropriate reference point for
Prospect Theory (Avineri and Prashker, 2004). Second, route-choice decisions are made repeatedly for commuting
and other routine trips, and it is plausible that as individuals become familiar with a particular environment their
travel decisions will converge towards expected utility maximization. Third, Avineri and Prashker (2005) found
that Cumulative Prospect Theory failed to predict route-choice feedback-based decisions observed in laboratory
experiments. Yet asymmetry with respect to gains and losses remains potentially relevant to describe route choice
decisions. A recent empirical application has been developed by de Lapparent (2009), who imbeds Cumulative
Prospect Theory in the Discrete Choice framework.
A third extension is to relax the assumption that travelers know the probability distribution of states and
to model learning. Jotisankasa and Polak (2005) review studies of learning in route and departure time choice,
and Bonsall (2008) discusses information acquisition and learning. In the model setting here it is drivers with
intermediate degrees of risk aversion who have the most to gain from learning the distribution of states on the
risky route – either by driving on it themselves or by drawing on other drivers’ experience (see Chancelier et al.
(2007) for the case of a single driver facing uncertainty and rational learning concerning the unknown probability of
good and bad days). The extension involving both learning and congestion would lead to the information cascade
problem described in economics (see Bikhchandani et al., 2006). One question that arises is whether provision of
information would speed up learning. In theory the answer would appear to be yes, but if information is conveyed
in the form of advice it may deter people from learning (Adler, 2001; Chorus et al., 2006).
Finally, the model could be made more practically useful by considering heterogeneity in value of time and
idiosyncratic preferences with respect to routes. Such preferences could be estimated using surveys and stated
preference methods as in De Palma and Picard (2005). For the purpose of designing and operating ATIS systems
this would help to identify diﬀerent driver categories and the amount and type of information that would be of
greatest benefit to them. There is a need for more empirical studies of risk aversion and route-choice decisions
in the context of information provision – both in the field and in laboratory settings (see, for example, Helbing
(2004), Rapoport et al. (2006) and Hartman (2007)).
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8 Appendixes
8.1 Appendix 1: Assumption 3, HARA, CRRA and CARA preferences
Since CRRA is obtained from HARA simply by setting parameter a = 0, whereas the transformation from HARA
to CARA is more cumbersome, Assumption 3 will be verified separately for HARA and CARA.
8.1.1 HARA preferences
U (t; θ) ≡ u = − (a+t)
1+θ
1+θ is diﬀerentiable, and U (t; 0) = − (a+ t). For θ > 0 and t > 0, U (t; θ) is negative
and strictly concave in t. ∂U∂θ = −
(1+θ)(a+t)1+θ ln(a+t)−(a+t)1+θ
(1+θ)2 = −
(a+t)1+θ
1+θ
³
ln (a+ t)− 11+θ
´
. Now (a+ t)1+θ =
− (1 + θ)u, and ln (a+ t) = ln(−(1+θ)u)1+θ . Hence φ (u) ≡
∂U
∂θ = u
ln(−(1+θ)u)−1
1+θ ,
∂φ
∂u =
ln(−(1+θ)u)
1+θ , and
∂2φ
∂u2 =
1
(1+θ)u <
0 for t > 0. Finally, Lim
θ→∞
U(t2;θ)
U(t1;θ)
= Lim
θ→∞
³
a+t2
a+t1
´1+θ
=∞ for t2 > t1 > 0.
8.1.2 CARA preferences
U (t; θ) ≡ u = 1−exp(θt)θ is diﬀerentiable and U (t; 0) = −t. For θ > 0 and t > 0, U (t; θ) is negative and strictly
concave in t. ∂U∂θ =
−θ+t exp(θt)+exp(θt)−1
θ2 . Now exp (θt) = 1 − θu, and t =
ln(1−θu)
θ . Hence φ (U) ≡
∂U
∂θ =
−θ(1−θu) ln(1−θu)θ +1−(1−θu)
θ2 =
−(1−θu) ln(1−θu)+θu
θ2 .
∂φ
∂u =
θ ln(1−θu)+θ−θ
θ2 =
ln(1−θu)
θ , and
∂2φ
∂u2 = −
1
(1−θu) < 0. Finally,
Lim
θ→∞
U(t2;θ)
U(t1;θ)
= Lim
θ→∞
1−exp(θt2)
1−exp(θt2) = Limθ→∞
exp (θ (t2 − t1)) =∞ for t2 > t1 > 0.
8.2 Appendix 2: Comparative statics properties of equilibria with risk-neutral drivers
8.2.1 No information regime
In the No information equilibrium the division of traﬃc, nZR and n
Z
S , equalizes expected travel costs between routes:
ECZ = (1− p) t−R + pt
+
R
¡
nZR
¢
= tS
¡
nZS
¢
, where nZS = N − nZR. Comparative statics properties of the equilibrium
are derived by totally diﬀerentiating this condition:
∂nZR
∂p =
t−R−t
+
R(n
Z
R)
∂tS(N−nZR)
∂nS
+p
∂t+R(nZR)
∂nR
< 0, ∂n
Z
R
∂N =
∂tS(N−nZR)
∂nZS
∂tS(N−nZR)
∂nS
+p
∂t+R(nZR)
∂nR
∈ (0, 1),
∂E·CZ
∂p = −
∂tS(N−nZR)
∂nS
∂nZR
∂p > 0,
∂E·CZ
∂N =
∂tS(N−nZR)
∂nS
³
1− ∂n
Z
R
∂N
´
> 0.
8.2.2 Costly information regime
Equilibrium when nCS > 0 If strategies R, I and S are all adopted in the Costly information equilibrium, the
numbers in each group, nCR, n
C
S and n
C
I , are determined by the accounting identity
nCR + n
C
S + n
C
I = N , (6)
and two equal-cost conditions. First, the expected costs of Strategies I and R must be equal:
π + (1− p) t−R + tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
= (1− p) t−R + pt
+
R
¡
nCR
¢
. (7)
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Condition (7) can be written π = p
¡
t+R
¡
nCR
¢
− tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢¢
: the cost of information must balance the travel time
saving gained by taking Route S rather than Route R on Bad days. Second, the expected costs of Strategies I and
S must be equal:
π + (1− p) t−R + tS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
= (1− p) tS
¡
nCS
¢
+ ptS
¡
nCS + n
C
I
¢
. (8)
Condition (8) can be written π = (1− p)
¡
tS (ncS)− t−R
¢
: the cost of information must balance the travel time
saving gained by taking Route R rather than Route S on Good days.
Totally diﬀerentiating (6), (7) and (8) one obtains
∂nCR
∂π =
1
p
#
∂tS(nCS+nCI )
∂nS
+
∂t+R(nCR)
∂nR
$ > 0, ∂n
C
R
∂p =
tS(nCS+n
C
I )−t
+
R(n
C
R)
p
#
∂tS(nCS+nCI )
∂nS
+
∂t+R(nCR)
∂nR
$ < 0,
∂nCR
∂N =
∂tS(nCS+nCI )
∂nS
∂tS(nCS+nCI )
∂nS
+
∂t+R(nCR)
∂nR
∈ (0, 1); ∂n
C
S
∂π =
1
(1−p)
∂tS(nCS )
∂nS
> 0, ∂n
C
S
∂p =
tS(nCS )−t
−
R
(1−p)
∂tS(nCS )
∂nS
> 0, ∂n
C
S
∂N = 0;
∂nCI
∂π = −
³
∂nCR
∂π +
∂nCS
∂π
´
< 0, ∂n
C
I
∂p = −
³
∂nCR
∂p +
∂nCS
∂p
´
s
= (1− p)2 ∂tS(n
C
S )
∂nS
− p2
µ
∂tS(nCS+nCI )
∂nS
+
∂t+R(n
C
R)
∂nR
¶
; ∂n
C
I
∂N =
∂t+R(nCR)
∂nR
∂tS(nCS+nCI )
∂nS
+
∂t+R(nCR)
∂nR
∈ (0, 1).
Using these derivatives it is readily shown that ECC is an increasing function of π, p and N . Note that the
derivative ∂n
C
I
∂p switches sign from positive to negative as p increases.
Equilibrium when nCS = 0 If the cost of information is suﬃciently small, the condition I ≈ S is not satisfied
even with nCS = 0; i.e. π < (1− p)
¡
tS (0)− t−R
¢
. If so, Condition (8) is not applicable and the equilibrium is
derived using Conditions (6) and (7) with nCS = 0. The comparative statics properties of the model are the same
as for nCS > 0 except that
∂nCI
∂p = −
∂nCR
∂p =
t+R(n
C
R)−tS(nCS+nCI )
p
#
∂tS(nCS+nCI )
∂nS
+
∂t+R(nCR)
∂nR
$ > 0, so that the ambiguity in the sign of this
derivative is eliminated.
8.3 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2
Part (a) follows from the inequality tS (0) > t−R. For Part (b) defineΨ (nR) ≡ t
+
R (nR)−tS (N − nR). By Assumption
1, Ψ (nR) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of nR. By Assumption 2, Ψ (0) = t+R (0) − tS (N) < 0,
and Ψ (N) = t+R (N) − tS (0) > 0. Hence there exists a unique n
F+
R ∈ (0, N) such that Ψ
¡
nF+R
¢
= t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
−
tS
¡
N − nF+R
¢
= 0.
8.4 Appendix 4: Proof of Lemma 1
Part (a): Define ψ (p,NR; θ) ≡ pU
¡
t+R (NR) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
− U (tS (N −NR) ; θ).
ψ (p,NR; 0) = −
£
pt+R (NR) + (1− p) t
−
R
¤
+ tS (N −NR) > 0. Given t+R (NR) > tS (N −NR) and Assumption 3,
Lim
θ→∞
ψ (p,NR; θ) < 0. Given Assumption 3, ψ (·) is a continuous function of θ. Hence there exists at least one θ˜Z
such that ψ
³
p,NR; θ˜
Z´
= 0 and hence R ≈ S. Let Let Ei denote the expectations operator for route i, i ∈ {R,S}.
Then ψ = ERU (t; θ)− ESU (t; θ), and ∂ψ∂θ = ER
∂U(t;θ)
∂θ − ES
∂U(t;θ)
∂θ . By Assumption 3, ∂U/∂θ is a strictly concave
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function of U . Hence by Jensen’s inequality
∂ψ (p,NR; θ)
∂θ
¯¯¯
θ=θ˜Z(p,NR)
< 0 . (9)
This proves that θ˜
Z
(p,NR) is unique. Furthermore,
ψ (p,NR; θ) ≷ 0 as θ ≶ θ˜Z (p,NR) . (10)
Part (b): Consider p0 > p. Since t+R (NR) > tS (N −NR), ψ
³
p0, NR; θ˜
Z
(p,NR)
´
> 0. Given (9) it follows that
θ˜
Z
(p0,NR) < θ˜
Z
(p,NR); hence θ˜
Z
(p,NR) is strictly decreasing in p.
Now consider N´R > NR. Since t+R (NR) is increasing in NR and tS (N −NR) is decreasing in NR,
ψ
³
p, N´R; θ˜
Z
(p,NR)
´
> 0. By similar reasoning it follows that θ˜
Z
(p,NR) is strictly decreasing in NR.
8.5 Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 3
Since the cdf F (θ) is continuous and strictly increasing for θ ∈ I, n (θ) = NF (θ) defines an increasing relationship,
with n (0) = 0 and n (θ) →
θ→∞
N . Furthermore, Lemma 1 implies that θ˜
Z
(p,NR) defines a decreasing relationship
between θ and n, with n (θ) ∈ [0, N ]. The two curves therefore cross exactly once, which defines nZR (p) and
θ˜
Z
(p,NR). Consider the function
Ω (p, n; θ) ≡ pU
¡
t+R (n) ; θ
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
− U (tS (N − n) ; θ) .
According to Assumption 2, t−R < t
+
R (n), so U
¡
t+R (n) ; θ
¢
− U
¡
t−R; θ
¢
< 0 and ∂Ω∂p < 0. Decreasing utility and
Assumption 1 imply that U
¡
t+R (n) ; θ
¢
is decreasing in n and U (tS (N − n) ; θ) is increasing in n, so ∂Ω∂n < 0.
Finally, for any relevant (p, n), Ω is locally decreasing in θ at point
³
p, n, θ˜
Z
p (n)
´
because, according to Lemma 1,
Ω
³
p, n, θ˜
Z
(p, n)
´
= 0, Ω (p, n; θ) > 0 for any θ < θ˜
Z
(p, n) and Ω (p, n; θ) < 0 for any θ > θ˜
Z
(p, n). As a result,
∂θ˜Z(p,nZR)
∂p = −
∂Ω
∂p /
∂Ω
∂θ < 0, and
∂nZR
∂p =
∂nZR
∂θ
∂θ˜Z(p,nZR)
∂p = Nf
³
θ˜
Z´ ∂θ˜Z(p,nZR)
∂p < 0.
8.6 Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 4
Part (a): By Proposition 3, in the No information regime
pU
³
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θ˜
Z´
+ (1− p)U
³
t−R; θ˜
Z´
= U
³
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
; θ˜
Z´
where θ˜
Z
> 0. (11)
Given t+R
¡
nZR
¢
> t−R, it follows that
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
> tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
. (12)
With Free information:
t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
= tS
¡
N − nF+R
¢
. (13)
Inequality (12) and equation (13) imply nF+R < n
Z
R.
Part (b): The goal is to show pt+R
¡
nF+R
¢
+(1− p) t−R < pt
+
R
¡
nZR
¢
+(1− p) t−R < tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
. The first inequality
follows from Part (a). The second inequality follows from equation (11) and θ˜
Z
> 0.
Part (c): Travel times in the No information and Free information regimes are given in the following table:
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Row Regime Group Good days Bad days
1 No information R t−R t
+
R
¡
nZR
¢
2 No information S tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
3 Free information R and S t−R t
+
R
¡
nF+R
¢
That travel time variability decreases for Group R follows from Rows 1 and 3, and t−R < t
+
R
¡
nF+R
¢
< t+R
¡
nZR
¢
. That
travel time variability increases for Group S follows from Rows 2 and 3, and t−R < tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
< t+R
¡
nF+R
¢
.
8.7 Appendix 7: Compensating variation and degree of risk aversion
Let travel time in the No information regime (Z) be T1 on Good days, and T2 on Bad days. And let travel time
in the Free information (F ), Costly information (C), or Private information regime (I) be T3 on Good days, and
T4 on Bad days. The compensating variation CV r (θ) for information regime r, r ∈ {F,C, I}, is defined by the
condition
Ψ (θ) ≡ EUr (T + CV r (θ) ; θ)− EUZ (T ; θ) = 0,
or
(1− p)U (T3 + CV r (θ) ; θ) + pU (T4 + CV r (θ) ; θ)− (1− p)U (T1; θ)− pU (T2; θ) = 0.
Two generic cases cover all the cases considered in the text.
8.7.1 Case 1: T1 = T3 < T4 < T2
This case covers CV FR , CV
C
RR, CV
C
RI and CV
I
R. CV for these cases is guaranteed to be positive. With CV
r (θ) > 0,
U1 > U3 > U4 > U2, and No information induces a mean-preserving spread of utility relative to information. Now
∂ψ
∂θ = E
r ∂U(t;θ)
∂θ − EZ
∂U(t;θ)
∂θ . By Assumption 3, ∂U/∂θ is a strictly concave function of U . Hence by Jensen’s
inequality ∂ψ∂θ
¯¯
CV r(θ) > 0 . Given
∂ψ
∂CV r(θ) < 0, it follows that CV
r (θ) is an increasing function of θ for Case 1.
8.7.2 Case 2: T3 < T1 = T2 ≤ T4
This case covers CV FS , CV
C
SI , CV
C
SS and CV
I
S . CV is not guaranteed to be positive. But whether or not it is positive,
after CV is added to travel times U3 > U1 = U2 > U4. Information therefore induces a mean-preserving spread
of utility relative to No information. Hence by Jensen’s inequality ∂ψ∂θ
¯¯
CV r(θ) < 0 , and CV r (θ) is a decreasing
function of θ for Case 2.
8.8 Appendix 8: Compensating variation is negative for suﬃciently risk-averse
drivers
For brevity let tZ denote (certain) travel time with No information, tG travel time on Good days with information,
and tB > tG travel time on Bad days with information. CV (θ) is defined by the condition
pU (tB + CV (θ) ; θ) + (1− p)U (tG + CV (θ) ; θ)− U
¡
tZ ; θ
¢
= 0,
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or
G (t; θ) ≡ U
¡
tZ ; θ
¢
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
pU (tB + t; θ) + (1− p)U (tG + t; θ)
U (tZ ; θ)| {z }
≡H(t;θ)
− 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ = 0 at t = CV (θ) .
If t < tZ − tB then Lim
θ→∞
H (t; θ) = 0, and Lim
θ→∞
G (t; θ) = ∞. If t > tZ − tB then Lim
θ→∞
H (t; θ) = ∞, and
Lim
θ→∞
G (t; θ) = −∞. Therefore Lim
θ→∞
CV (θ) = tZ − tB. Now tZ = tS
¡
N − nZ+R
¢
. With Free information, tB =
tS
¡
N − nF+R
¢
and Lim
θ→∞
CV (θ) = tS
¡
N − nZ+R
¢
−tS
¡
N − nF+R
¢
< 0. With Costly information, tB = tS
¡
N − nC+R
¢
and Lim
θ→∞
CV (θ) = tS
¡
N − nZ+R
¢
− tS
¡
N − nC+R
¢
< 0.
8.9 Appendix 9: Proof of Lemma 2
Part (a): The proof follows closely the proof of Lemma 1. R R S ⇐⇒ ψRS (θ; p, nR, nS , nI) T 0. If R Â S
for all θ ∈ [0,∞) then θˆRS = 0. If R ≺ S for all θ ∈ [0,∞) then θˆRS = ∞. If neither preference ranking
holds for all θ then, by continuity of ψRS in θ, there exists at least one θˆRS such that ψRS
³
θˆRS ; ·
´
= 0. Now
ψRS = ERU (t; θ)− ESU (t; θ), and
∂ψRS
∂θ = ER
∂U(t;θ)
∂θ − ES
∂U(t;θ)
∂θ . By Assumption 3, ∂U/∂θ is a strictly concave
function of U , and hence by Jensen’s inequality
∂ψRS
∂θ
¯¯¯
θ=θˆRS < 0 , (14)
and θˆRS is unique. Furthermore,
ψRS (θ; p, nR, nS , nI) ≷ 0 as θ ≶ θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) . (15)
Part (b): Consider p0 > p. Since t−R < tS (nS) and t
+
R (nR) ≥ tS (nS + nI),
U
³
t−R; θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI)
´
> U
³
tS (nS) ; θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI)
´
, and
U
³
t+R (nR) ; θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI)
´
≤ U
³
tS (nS + nI) ; θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI)
´
.
Therefore ψRS
³
θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) ; p0, nR, nS , nI
´
< 0. Given (14) it follows that
θˆRS (p0, nR, nS , nI) < θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) .
This proves that θˆRS is decreasing in p. The comparative statics properties for nR, nS and nI are derived similarly
using the respective inequalities
ψRS
³
θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) ; p, n0R, nS , nI
´
< 0 for n0R > nR,
ψRS
³
θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) ; p, nR, n0S , nI
´
> 0 for n0S > nS ,
ψRS
³
θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) ; p, nR, nS , n0I
´
> 0 for n0I > nI .
8.10 Appendix 10: Proof of Lemma 3
Part (a): The proof follows the proof of Lemma 2(a) by replacing regime S by regime I.
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Part (b): Consider p0 > p. Since t−R < t
−
R + π and t
+
R (nR) ≥ tS (nS + nI),
U
³
t−R; θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI)
´
> U
³
t−R + π; θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI)
´
, and
U
³
t+R (nR) ; θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI)
´
≤ U
³
tS (nS + nI) ; θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI)
´
.
Hence ψRI
³
θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI) , π; p0, nR, nS + nI
´
< 0. The counterpart to Condition (15) is
ψRI (θ, π; p, nR, nS + nI) ≷ 0 as θ ≶ θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI) .
It follows that
θˆRI (π, p0, nR, nS + nI) < θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI) .
The comparative statics properties for nR, π and nS + nI are derived similarly using the respective inequalities
ψRI
³
θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI) , π; p, n0R, nS + nI
´
< 0 for n0R > nR,
ψRI
³
θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI) , π0; p, nR, nS + nI
´
> 0 for π0 > π,
ψRI
³
θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI) , π; p, nR, n0S + n
0
I
´
> 0 for n0S + n
0
I > nS + nI .
8.11 Appendix 11: Proof of Lemma 4
Part (a): The proof follows the proof of Lemma 2(a) by replacing regime R by regime I.
Part (b): The comparative statics properties for π, p, nI , nS , and nS with nS + nI held constant are derived
using the respective inequalities
ψIS
³
θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI) , π0; p, nS , nI
´
< 0 for π0 > π,
ψIS
³
θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI) , π; p0, nS , nI
´
< 0 for p0 > p,
ψIS
³
θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI) , π; p, nS , n0I
´
< 0 for n0I > nI ,
ψIS
³
θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI) , π; p, n0S , nI
´
≷ 0 for n0S > nS ,
ψIS
³
θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI) , π; p, n0S , n
0
I
´
> for n0S > nS and n
0
S + n
0
I = nS + nI
The last three inequalities are readily established if it assumed that all relevant functions are diﬀerentiable. For
the third inequality:
∂ψIS
∂nI
= p
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
∂U (tS (nS + nI) + π; θ)
∂t
− ∂U (tS (nS + nI) ; θ)
∂t| {z }
−
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
∂tS (nS + nI)
∂NS| {z }
+
< 0,
34
where the term in square brackets is negative because U (·) is strictly concave in t. For the fourth inequality:
∂ψIS
∂nS
= p
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
∂U (tS (nS + nI) + π; θ)
∂t
− ∂U (tS (nS + nI) ; θ)
∂t| {z }
−
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
∂tS (nS + nI)
∂NS| {z }
+
− (1− p) ∂U (tS (nS) ; θ)
∂t| {z }
−
∂tS (nS)
∂NS| {z }
+
≷ 0.
For the fifth inequality
∂ψIS
∂nS
− ∂ψIS
∂nI
= − (1− p) ∂U (tS (nS) ; θ)
∂t| {z }
−
∂tS (nS)
∂NS| {z }
+
> 0.
8.12 Appendix 12: Proof of Proposition 6
By Proposition 5, for any (p, nR, nS , nI) there exists a unique price π = πˆ (p, nR, nS , nI) and a unique risk aversion
threshold θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI) such that a driver with risk aversion θˆRS is indiﬀerent between R, S and I. With
π = πˆ, nI = 0. The size of group R is nR = NF (θ) with θ = θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI = 0). By Assumption 4, F (·) is
continuous and strictly increasing in θ over its support so that nR is a continuous and strictly increasing function
of θ, with nR = 0 at θ = 0 and Lim
θ→∞
nR = N . By Lemma 2, θˆRS is continuous and decreasing with nR, and
continuous and increasing with nS . And by Assumption 4, θˆRS (p, nR = N,nS = 0, nI = 0) <∞. Hence the pair of
equations nR = NF (θ) and θ = θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI = 0) has a unique solution nR = nCR0 (p,N) and θ = θ
C
0 (p,N)
with nCR0 = NF
³
θC0
´
and θC0 = θˆRS
¡
p, nCR0,N − nCR0, 0
¢
. In addition, πC (p,N) = πˆ
¡
p, nCR0, N − nCR0, 0
¢
.
To establish the comparative statics properties for p, consider p0 > p. The curve n = NF (θ) is unchanged
while the curve θ = θˆRS (p, nR, nS , nI = 0) is decreasing in p by Lemma 2. Hence θC0 (p0, N) < θ
C
0 (p,N) and
nCR0 (p
0, N) < nCR0 (p,N).
8.13 Appendix 13: Proof of Proposition 7
For π = πC (p,N) the equilibrium is as described in Proposition 6 with no one choosing strategy I. The same equilib-
rium clearly applies for π > πC (p,N). For 0 < π < πC (p,N), all three strategies R, S and I are selected. By Propo-
sition 5, for any (p, nR, nS , nI) there exists a unique price πˆ (p, nR, nS , nI) and two functions θˆRI (π, p, nR, nS + nI)
and θˆIS (π, p, nS , nI) such that for π < πˆ, θˆRI < θˆIS and nR = NF
³
θˆRI
´
, nI = N
³
F
³
θˆIS
´
− F
³
θˆRI
´´
and
nS = N
³
1− F
³
θˆIS
´´
. The five unknowns
³
nCR, n
C
S , n
C
I , θˆRI , θˆIS
´
can be solved in two steps. The first step is to
solve nCR and θˆRI . The function NF (θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ over its support. By Proposition
5, θˆRI is continuous, decreasing in nR, and increasing in nS+nI . And θˆRI (π, p,N, 0) <∞. Hence the pair of equa-
tions nR = NF (θ) and θ = θˆRI (π, p, nR, N − nR) has a unique solution nR = nCR (π, p,N) and θ = θA (π, p,N)
with nCR = NF (θA) and θA = θˆRI
¡
π, p, nCR, N − nCR
¢
.
The second step is to solve nCS , n
C
I , and θˆIS . Now θˆIS ∈
h
θˆRS ,∞
´
and nCS + n
C
I = N − nCR. The func-
tion nS = N (1− F (θ)) is continuous and decreasing from N − nCR to 0 as θˆIS increases from θˆRS to ∞. By
Proposition 5, θˆIS is a continuous and increasing function of nS with nS + nI held fixed. Hence the pair of equa-
tions nS = N (1− F (θ)) and θ =θˆIS
¡
π, p, nS , nI = N − nCR − nS
¢
has a unique solution nS = nCS (π, p,N) and
θB =θˆIS
¡
π, p, nCS , N − nCR − nCS
¢
. Finally, nI = nCI (π, p,N) = N − nCR − nCS .
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8.14 Appendix 14: Comparative statics of Costly information equilibrium
The five endogenous variables {nR, nS , nI , θA, θB} are determined by the five equations
nR = NF (θA) , (16)
nI = N (F (θB)− F (θA)) , (17)
nS = N (1− F (θA)) , (18)
indiﬀerence between Strategies R and I at θ = θA:
pU
¡
t+R (nR) ; θA
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θA
¢
= pU (tS (N − nR) + π; θA) + (1− p)U
¡
t−R + π; θA
¢
, (19)
and indiﬀerence between Strategies I and S at θ = θB:
pU(tS(N − nR) + π; θB) + (1−p)U
¡
t−R + π; θB
¢
= pU(tS(N − nR) ; θB) + (1−p)U(tS(nS) ; θB) . (20)
Variable nI does not appear in eqns. (19) or (20), and hence can be solved ex post using eqn. (17). To simplify
notation, index the six travel times numerically in order of increasing magnitude:
t−R|{z}
t1
< t−R + π| {z }
t2
< tS(nS)| {z }
t3
< tS(nS + nI)| {z }
t4
< tS(nS + nI) + π| {z }
t5
< t+R (nR)| {z }
t6
,
and define mij ≡ ∂U(ti;θj)∂t < 0, ci ≡
∂ti
∂ni
> 0, vij ≡ ∂U(ti;θj)∂θ < 0 and Uij ≡ U (ti; θj) < 0, i = 1, ..., 6, j = A,B.
(Note that c1 = c2 = 0 < c3 ≤ c4 = c5.) Eqns. (16), (18), (19) and (20) can then be written:
nR −NF (θA) = 0, (21)
nS −N (1− F (θB)) = 0, (22)
p (U6A− U5A) + (1− p) (U1A− U2A) = 0, (23)
p (U4B− U5B) + (1− p) (U3B− U2B) = 0. (24)
Equations (21) and (23) are separable in nR and θA. The total diﬀerentials are"
1 −Nf (θA)
p (m5Ac5 +m6Ac6) p (v6A − v5A) + (1− p) (v1A − v2A)
#"
dnR
dθA
#
=
"
0 0 F (θA)
pm5A + (1− p)m2A U5 − U6 + U1 − U2 pm5Ac5
#⎡
⎢⎣
dπ
dp
dN
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Define ∆A ≡ p (v6A − v5A)+(1− p) (v1A − v2A)+p (m5Ac5 +m6Ac6)Nf (θA) < 0. The comparative statics eﬀects
for nR are:
∂nR
∂π
= ∆−1A
⎡
⎢⎣pm5A + (1− p)m2A| {z }
−
⎤
⎥⎦Nf (θA) > 0, (25)
36
∂nR
∂p
= ∆−1A
⎡
⎣U5 − U6 + U1 − U2| {z }
+
⎤
⎦Nf (θA) < 0, (26)
∂nR
∂N
= ∆−1A
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
F (θA)
⎡
⎢⎣p (v6A − v5A) + (1− p) (v1A − v2A)| {z }
−
⎤
⎥⎦+Nf (θA) pm5Ac5| {z }
−
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
∈ (0, 1) . (27)
Given (21), (25) and (26),
∂θA
∂π
> 0, and
∂θA
∂p
< 0, (28)
∂θA
∂N
= ∆−1A p [m5Ac5 (1− F (θA))−m6Ac6F (θA)]
s
=?, (29)
where s=? indicates that the sign is indeterminate. Equations (22) and (24) can be used to derive the compara-
tive statics for nS and θB by substituting in the comparative statics derivatives just derived for nR. The total
diﬀerentials are "
1 Nf (θB)
(1− p)m3Bc3 p (v4B − v5B) + (1− p) (v3B − v2B)
#"
dnS
dθB
#
=
⎡
⎢⎣
0 0 1− F (θB)
pm5B + (1− p)m2B
+p (m4Bc4 −m5Bc5) dnRdπ
U5 − U4 + U3 − U2
+p (m4Bc4 −m5Bc5) dnRdp
p (m5Bc5 −m4Bc4) ·¡
1− dnRdN
¢
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣
dπ
dp
dN
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Define ∆B ≡ p (v4B − v5B)+(1− p) (v3B − v2B)− (1− p)m3Bc3Nf (θB) > 0. The comparative statics derivatives
for nS are:
∂nS
∂π
= −∆−1B
⎡
⎢⎢⎣pm5B + (1− p)m2B| {z }
−
+ p(m4Bc4 −m5Bc5)| {z }
+
∂nR
∂π| {z }
+
⎤
⎥⎥⎦Nf (θB)
s
=?, (30)
∂nS
∂p
= −∆−1B
⎡
⎢⎢⎣U5 − U4 + U3 − U2| {z }
−
+ p(m4Bc4 −m5Bc5)| {z }
+
∂nR
∂p| {z }
−
⎤
⎥⎥⎦Nf (θB) > 0, (31)
∂nS
∂N = ∆
−1
B
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[p (v4B − v5B) + (1− p) (v3B − v2B)]| {z }
+
(1− F (θB))
−p(m5Bc5 −m4Bc4)| {z }
−
µ
1− ∂nR
∂N
¶
| {z }
+
Nf (θB)
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
> 0. (32)
Given (22), (30) and (31)
∂θB
∂π
s
=?, and
∂θB
∂p
< 0.
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Given (22) and (32)
∂θB
∂N
= ∆−1B
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣p(m5Bc5 −m4Bc4)| {z }
−
µ
1− ∂nR
∂N
¶
| {z }
+
− (1− p)m3Bc3| {z }
−
(1− F (θB))
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
s
=?,
∂nI
∂π
= −
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∂nR
∂π| {z }
+
+
∂nS
∂π|{z}
?
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
s
=?,
∂nI
∂p
= −
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∂nR
∂p| {z }
−
+
∂nS
∂p|{z}
+
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
s
=?,
∂nI
∂N
= 1−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∂nR
∂N| {z }
+
+
∂nS
∂N|{z}
+
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
s
=?
8.15 Appendix 15: Proof of Proposition 8
The proof has a similar structure to the proof of Lemma 2. By Theorem 3, CV I (θ) is maximal at θ = θRS , where
θRS is defined by the condition of indiﬀerence between Strategies R and S:
pU
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θRS
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R; θRS
¢
= U
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
; θRS
¢
,
or
p
U
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θRS
¢
U
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
; θRS
¢ + (1− p) U ¡t−R; θRS¢
U
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
; θRS
¢ = 1. (33)
Now Lim
p→0
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
= t+R (N), Limp→0
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
= tS (0), Lim
p→0
θRS =∞, and
Lim
p→0
U(t−R ;θRS)
U(tS(N−nZR);θRS)
= Lim
p→0
U(t−R ;θRS)
U(tS(0);θRS)
= 0 since t−R < tS (0). Hence by (33)
p
U
¡
t+R
¡
nZR
¢
; θRS
¢
U
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
; θRS
¢ →
p→0
1. (34)
CV I (θRS) is defined by the condition
pU
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
+ CV I (θRS) ; θRS
¢
+ (1− p)U
¡
t−R + CV
I (θRS) ; θRS
¢
−U
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
; θRS
¢
= 0,
or
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G (t; p, θRS (p)) ≡ U
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
; θRS
¢
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p
U
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
+ t; θRS
¢
U
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
; θRS
¢| {z }
≡H(t;p,θRS(p))
+
(1− p)
U
¡
t−R + t; θRS
¢
U
¡
tS
¡
N − nZR
¢
; θRS
¢| {z }
≡J(t;p,θRS(p))
− 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= 0 at t = CV I (θRS) .
There are two cases to consider.
8.15.1 Case 1: tS (0)− t−R < t
+
R (N)− tS (0) .
If t < tS (0) − t−R, then Limp→0J (·) = 0. And given tS (0) + t < tS (0) + t
+
R (N) − tS (0) = t
+
R (N), Limp→0
H (·) = 0 by
(34) and Lim
p→0
G (·) = +∞.
If t > tS (0)− t−R, then Limp→0J (·) = +∞ =⇒ Limp→0G (·) = −∞. Therefore Limp→0CV
I (θRS) = tS (0)− t−R.
8.15.2 Case 2: t+R (N)− tS (0) < tS (0)− t
−
R.
If t < t+R (N)− tS (0), then Limp→0J (·) = 0, Limp→0H (·) = 0 by (34) and Limp→0G (·) = +∞.
If t > t+R (N) − tS (0), then Limp→0H (·) = +∞ and Limp→0G (·) = −∞. Therefore Limp→0CV
I (θRS) = t+R (N) − tS (0).
Cases 1 and 2 combined imply CV I (θRS) →
p→0
Min
¡
tS (0)− t−R, t
+
R (N)− tS (0)
¢
.
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Figure 1: Travel time functions
40
Figure 2: Eﬀects of Free information with risk-neutral drivers and nCS > 0
41
Figure 3: Eﬀects of Costly information with risk-neutral drivers
Figure 4: Strategy choice with Costly information
42
Figure 5: Strategy choice in Costly information equilibrium
Figure 6: Strategy choices for No information and Costly information regimes
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Figure 7: Compensating variations for Free, Costly and Private information in numerical example
Figure 8: Strategy choice in Costly information equilibrium in numerical example
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Figure 9: Route splits in numerical example
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Figure 10: Compensating variation for Costly information in numerical example
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Figure 11: Varying probability of Bad days with Free information in numerical example
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Figure 12: Varying parameter θ¯ with Free information in numerical example
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